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8. A Review of Selected Lease Clauses
Aimee Williams Hebert
Gordon Arata McCollam Duplantis & Eagan, LLP,
New Orleans, Louisiana
ff. Introduction
The mineral lease is quite possibly the most frequently used contract
in any mineral producing jurisdiction. There are innumerable forms cur-
rently in use including both standard and custom drafted lease forms.
Within the myriad of lease forms certain "standard clauses" have
emerged, such as the habendem clause, royalty clause, Pugh clause, and
Mother Hubbard clause, but even these standard clauses vary widely. No
specific meaning may be given to any clause without an examination of
its particular terms and provisions. And, as with any contract, careful
drafting is necessary in light of the issues that have been raised by the
jurisprudence addressing the clauses.
It would takes weeks of time and hundreds of pages to give even the
most cursory treatment to every standard clause contained in ary of the
many standard lease forms. This paper will not endeavor to provide the
reader with exhaustive treatment of each provision of the mineral lease
but, instead, will address selected issues arising under the habendum
clause, the shut-in royalty clause, the Pugh clause, the Mother Hubbard
clause, and the adjacent land clause by examining Louisiana case law
where our courts have addressed issues arising thereunder and examining
case law in other states where Louisiana courts have yet to address an
important issue.
IffE. Selected Issues under the Habendum Clause
The Louisiana Mineral Code provides that all mineral leases must
have a term.' The term of a lease is generally fixed by the habendum
clause of a mineral lease. 2 A typical habendum clause in an "unless"3
type lease reads:
It is agreed that this lease shall remain in force for a term of ten
years from date and as long as oil, or gas, of whatsoever nature or
La. Min. Code art. 115 (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:115 (2007)).
2 8 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW at 465 (2006); 2
W.L. SUMMERS, LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 14.1, 186 (3 ed. 2006); Patrick S. Ottinger, Pro-
duction in "Paying Quantities "- A Fresh Look, 65 LA. L. REv. 635 (2005) ("A 'haben-
dum' clause is that provision which dictates the duration of a mineral lease.").
An "unless" clause follows the general format that, if operations for drilling are not
commenced on or before the anniversary date of the contract, the lease shall then termi-
nate unless on or before such anniversary date lessee pays or tenders to lessor the delay
rentals called for in the lease. See Mattison v. Trotti, 262 F.2d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 1959).
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kind, or either of them is produced from said land or drilling opera-
tions are c ntinued as hereinafter provided.4
The ten year period in the above clause is the primary term.s The
primary term i:s the period of time during which a lease may be main-
tained "even thDugh there is no production in paying quantities by virtue
of drilling operations on the leased land or the payment of rentals." 6 Such
a term is limited under Louisiana law to a maximum of ten years unless
the lease is being maintained by "drilling or mining operations or pro-
duction."7 The standard mineral lease typically provides for the produc-
tion of minerals from the lease premises as a means to extend a mineral
lease beyond it primary term.8 This is often referred to as the secondary
term of a lease.
The issue thus arises as to what is meant by "production" for the
purposes of the habendum clause in light of the policy that leases may
not be held for purely speculative purposes. Though many hadendum
clauses provide that production must be in "paying quantities," the draft-
ers of the Louisiana Mineral Code have provided for a default rule which
requires such a level of production to maintain a lease even in the ab-
sence of such language in the actual leases.' 0 Indeed, "[e]ven if 'paying
quantities' is not appended to the term production in a lease, article 124
of the Mineral Code and pre-Code jurisprudence add that requirement.""
Article 124 of the Louisiana Mineral Code provides:
When a mineral lease is being maintained by production of oil and
gas, the production must be in paying quantities. It is considered to
be in paying quantities when production allocable to the total origi-
nal right of the lessee to share in production under the lease is suffi-
cient to induce a reasonable prudent operator to continue production
4 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 at 465.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 803.
La. Min. Code art. 115 (La. Rev. Stat § 31:115 (2007)). See also Caldwell v. Hum-
ble Oil & Ref Co., 155 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
8 See La. Min. Code art. 124 Cmt. (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:124 (2007)).
See 8 WILLIA MS & MEYERS, supra note 2 at 952.
10 "Many lease! expressly require that the production be in paying quantities to main-
tain the lease. However, even though the phrase 'in paying quantities' is not present, the
courts will read it nto the lease with the result that "production" sufficient to maintain a
lease must be in paying quantities." (La. Min. Code art. 124 Cmt. (La. Rev. Stat. §
31:124)) (citing Coyle v. N. Am. Oil Conso., 9 So. 2d 473 (1942); Brown v. Sugar Creek
Syndicate, 197 So. 583 (1940); Logan v. Tholl Oil Co, 180 So. 473 (1938); Caldwell v.
Alton Oil Co., 108 So. 314 (1926)).
" LUTHER MCDOUGAL, LOUISIANA OIL & GAS LAW § 3.6, 137 (1995).
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in an effort to secure a return on his investment or to minimize any
loss.12
In article 124, the drafters codified the long standing policy of the State
of Louisiana to "prohibit the lessee from speculating with mineral inter-
ests or otherwise acting in a selfish manner, without regard for the les-
sor."' 3 As stated in the official comment to article 124:
One of the prime motivations of the requiremieit that there be pro-
duction in paying quantities is that the lessee shoAuld not be permit-
ted to maintain the lease indefinitely merely for speculative or other
selfish purposes. By establishing a primary term, beyond which the
lease cannot be maintained without drilling or production, the par-
ties have prohibited holding the property merely for speculative
purposes. Therefore, it follows that the parties to the normal type of
mineral lease do not intend the lease can be maintained beyond the
primary term by an amount of production which does not reasona-
bly hold out the prospect of making a profit on the lessee's total ex-
isting investment or of minimizing any loss he might suffer on that
investment.
Therefore, production is considered to be in paying quantities when the
lessee's share of production is sufficient enough to induce a prudent op-
erator to continue production in order to secure a return on his invest-
ment.
To determine if production is sufficient to maintain a lease beyond
its primary term, all matters which would influence a reasonable and
prudent operator must be considered.14 "The standard by which paying
quantities is determined is whether or not under all the relevant circum-
stances a reasonably prudent operator would, for the purpose making a
profit and not merely for speculation, continue to operate a well in the
12 La. Min. Code art. 124 (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:124 (2007)).
13 Ottinger, supra note 2 at 637-38 (citing Caldwell, 108 So. 2d at 142). The court in
Caldwell explained:
A development that falls short of a reasonable production which would bring a net
profit to the lessee and furnish an adequate consideration to the lessor of the con-
tinuance of the lease might well be said to be no development at all within the con-
templation of the parties . . . To hold that any production, however small, and in
less than paying quantities, gives to the lessee the right to continue the lease indefi--
nitely and with no obligation to further development, would be contrary to the es-
tablished rule of jurisprudence, and would be writing for the parties a contract the
never intended to make . . . It was never contemplated that the lease under consid-
eration should be continued for all time to come upon the mere production of oil in
quantities not sufficient to compensate the lessee and totally inadequate as a con-
sideration to the lessor for continuing the lease.
Caldwell, 108 So. 2d at 142.
14 Wood v. Axis Energy Corp., 899 So. 2d 138, 142 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2005) cert.
denied, 904 So. 2d 702 (La. 2005).
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manner in which the well in question was operated." 5 In determining
whether this star dard is met the following factors are typically reviewed:
(1) the reserves at issue and the price the lessee can obtain for the pro-
duction, (2) the ::elative profitableness of other wells in the area, (3) the
operating and marketing costs of the lease, (4) the lessee's profit, (5) the
actual provisions of the lease at issue, (6) a reasonable time period under
the circumstances, and (7) whether or not the lease is being held strictly
for speculation." Most importantly, the lessee must demonstrate that its
production income exceeds its operating expenses.17
What Time Period Is Considered?
Before emb irking on the comparison of production income and op-
erating expense, a time frame must be established in which such evalua-
tion will be limit -d. The minimum time period considered in determining
whether a mineral lease has produced in paying quantities is between
eight and eighteen months.18 While the maximum veriod that can be con-
sidered is not entirely clear in the jurisprudence,' it is clear that courts
can look to periods after the institution of a lawsuit in the analysis as
long production has not been affected by lessor's institution of a law-
suit.2 0 "It has been suggested that the courts should consider only such
period of past production as would shed light on the present status of
production and then only as one of the factors in determining present
status."2'
How is Production in Paying Qiuantities Calculated: Income
versus Operating Expenses?
15 La. Min. Code art. 124 Cmt. (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:124 Cmt. (2007)) (citing Clfton v.
Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 691 (Tex. 1958)).
16 Id; See also W~od, 899 So. 2d at 142 (citing Lege v. Lea Exploration, 631 So. 2d
716, 717 (La. App. 31 Cir. 1994)).
17 "Implicit in the term "paying quantities" is that the lessee is required to show a
profit; production income must exceed operating expenses." ONeal v. JHL Enter., Inc.,
862 So. 2d 1021, 1027 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2003)(citing Menoah Petroleum, Inc. v. Mc
Kinney, 545 So. 2d 1216 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989)).
1 Edmundson Bros. P'Ship v. Montex Drilling Co., 672 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1996) rev 'd an other grounds, 679 So. 2d 1364 (citing Brown, 197 So. at 583;
Smith v. Sun Oil Co.. 116 So. 379 (La. 1928); Caldwell, 108 So. at 314; Menoah Petro-
leum, 545 So. 2d at :216; Smith v. W. Va Oil & Gas, Co., 365 So. 2d 269 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1978) rev'd on other grounds, 373 So. 2d 488 (La. 1979); Noel v. Amoco Prod Co.,
826 F. Supp 1000 (W.D. La. 1993)).
19 Id. (Citing Noe,' Estate v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 886 (1953); Vance v. Hurley, 41 So. 2d
724 (1949); Coyle, 9 So. 2d at 473; Lege i Lea Exploration Co., 631 So. 2d 716 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 1994)).
20 "A lessor is estopped from complaining about any alleged cessation of production
in paying quantities that is the result of the lessee's failure to maintain and repair wells
during the pendency of the suit by the lessor." Noel, 826 F. Supp at 1015.
21 Ottinger, supra note 2 at 647 (quoting Leonard Wells, Production in Paying Quan-
tities - A New Look a ran Old Subject, 13 INsT. ON MIN. L. 88, 100 (1966)).
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Production income is the revenue from "production allocable to the
total right of the lessee to share in production" minus "adjustments for
severance tax and marketing costs." 22 This must be the actual income
received for the product sold during the period which is being analyzed.23
It is the value of the lessee's working interest after taxes and royalty
payments.2 4
The most litigated aspect of this analysis involves what is consid-
ered an "operating expense" and what is not. In order to be deemed pro-
ducing in "paying quantities," a lease must be producing in such a man-
ner as to yield a profit to the working interest owner over current operat-
ing expenses.25 Under general accounting principles of the oil and gas
industry, expenses related to producing leases are usually categorized in
to four general categories: (1) lease operating expenses, (2) repair and
remediation expenses, (3) equipment purchases, and (4) completion or
re-completion (workover) costs. 26 "Generally speaking, the operating
expenses are distinguished from the other three categories in that the
other three categories are considered extraordinary expenses, that is, ex-
penses that would not be thought of as normal operating costs." 27 Only
operating expenses may be considered in the analysis.
"When categorizing an expense as an operating expense to deter-
mine if production was. in paying quantities, ordinary and reoccurring
expenses are generally* distinguished from expenses that are extraordi-
nary and largely non-reoccurring." 2 8 Work over29 expenses are generally
22 Menoah Petroleam, 545 So. 2d at 1220-21. "Ad valoreum taxes should be consid-
ered when determining whether a reasonably prudent operator would continue to produce
a well for the purpose of making a profit and was not merely holding a lease for specula-
tion. A prudent operator would consider the amount of past due taxes when deciding
whether to continue to operate the lease or not. The annual recurring taxes are expenses
,which a prudent operator cannot ignore in an evaluation of whether to continue to operate
the lease." Id.
23 Id. at 1221 (rejecting the lessee's attempt to look at total production in 1986 rather
than at the total sales of 1986).
24 CCH, Inc. v. Heard, 410 So. 2d 1283, 1282 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
25 La Min. Code art. 124 Cmt. (La. Rev. Stat. §31124 Cmt. (2007)).
26 Lege, 631 So. 2d at 718.
27 Id. at 718-19. (finding that the "cost of conversion of the saltwater disposal well, as
well as workover expenses, are a capital expenditure and should not be included as an
operating expense for the purpose of determining there was production in paying quanti-
ties").
28 O'Neal v. JLHEnter., Inc., 82 So. 2d 1021, 1028 (La. Ap. .6Cir. 2003).
29 A "reworking operation" or "work over" can be defined as an activty "physically
associated with the well site and intimately connected with the esolution ok the difficulty
which caused the well to cease production." Id. (Citing Jardelk v. Hillin OilCo., 485 So.
2d 919 (La. 1986) (citations omitted)).
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considered extraordinary expenses and therefore are generally are not
included as an operating expenses.30
Another instructive tool in classifying expenses as current operating
expenses or not, is whether the expenses have been actually billed by the
operator.3' For example, overhead expenses are typically not considered
an operating expense in the analysis of whether or not a well is produc-
ing in paying quantities.32 However, if the well is being operated by party
who is not a lessee, such expenses are considered an "operating ex-
pense."
In Lege v. Lea Exploration Co.,34 the Louisiana Third Circuit Court
of Appeal address ed the issue of whether a particular expenditure was an
ordinary operating expense or a capital expenditure. The expense at issue
in Lege was the -ost of conversion of a saltwater disposal well.3s The
lessor argued tha:, if the lessee had not installed the saltwater disposal
system, the saltwater would have had to be transported away from the
wellsite." The les sor reasoned that "since lifting and trucking are undis-
puted 'operating expenses,' by analogy, .so should be the expenditures
which replace them."" The court rejected the lessor's argument stating:
We are unable to accept the premise of plaintiff's position, that the
nature of a lessee's cost is determined strictly by the substitution ac-
complished. Instead, we choose to. follow the more traditional un-
derstanding that a expenditure's classification is generally deter-
mined more by whether it is ordinary and recurring or extraordinary
38and largely non-recurring in nature.
The court found that due to the nature of these expenses as "non-
operating" the well at issue was producing in paying quantities, and the
lease was not subject to cancellation.
30 Id. (Citing Lege 631 So. 2d at 716.).
"1 Menoah Petroleum, 545 So. 2d at 1221 (finding the defendant's operating ex AJdise
report "a more accural e reflection of the unit expenses since the report contains the acial
charges billed by the operator.")
12 Id.
13 Id. (Citing 2 KuNTz, THE LAW OF OIL & GAS, §26.7 (1964); 43 A.L.R.3d 8 (1972)).
See also Edmundson Bros., 672 So. 2d at 1064. ("We start with the proposition that
where the lessee is al ;o the operator, the operator's overhead cannot be included in the
operating expenses charged to the lease. This rule does not apply where the unit is being
operated by a party other than the lessee.).
:14 Lege, 631 So. 2d at 716.
1s Id. at 719.
16 Id. at 718.
:7 Id.
Id. at 719.
Id.
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While courts have looked at various factors in examining whether or
not a lease is producing in paying quantities, the most important re-
quirement throughout the jurisprudence appears to be the favorable com-
parison of production income to operating expenses. In order for a lease
to be deemed producing in paying quantities, it must be producing
enough revenue to cover the operating expenses and provide a small
profit for the lessee. If the lease is not producing in paying quantities,
production is insufficient to hold the lease beyond its primary term.
III. Selected Issues under the Shut-In Clause
As noted in Section I above, the typical habendum clause in an oil
and gas lease provides that the lease will terminate at the expiration of its
primary term unless oil and gas is being produced or reworking or drill-
ing operations are in progress. 40 In the absence of a special provision to
the contrary, termination would occur even if a well had been completed
on the leased premises capable of producinf in commercial quantities if
the lessee is unable to produce the well. 4 Thus, modern oil and gas
leases almost invariably contain a shut-in or in lieu payment provision
allowing the lessee to maintain the lease through the payment of a sum of
money when production has been discovered, but the well in which such
production has been achieved has to be shut-in.42 The advent of the
clause dates back to the 1930s, but it did not come into wide use until the
1940s or 195Os.43 And, the clause remains in common use today.
The justification for inclusion of shut-in clauses arises from the dif-
ference between oil and gas." While oil can be stored in tanks and trans-
ported by trucks, pipelines, or tank cars, the only significant storage
place for natural gas is the underground reservoir in which it is found.4 5
If there is no available pipeline, the gas must remain in the ground until a
40 D. Douglas Howard, Problems of Interpreting and Applying Shut-in Clauses, II
LA. INST. ON MIN L. 3 (1964); Leslie Moses, Problems in Connection with Shut-In Roy-
alty Provisions in Oil and Gas Leases, 23 TUL. L. REv. 374 (1948) (Moses I); Wilmer D.
Masterson, Jr., The Shut-In Royalty Clause in an Oil and Gas Lease, 4 ROCKY MT. MIN.
L. INST. 1315, 321 (1959).
41 See Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 135 So. 15 (1931). See also 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, Su-
pra note 2 § 631 at 469.2-98; Moses I, supra note 40 at 375. It should be noted that in
some states - Montana, Oklahoma, and West Virginia-courts have held that a lease may
be maintained beyond its primary term by discovery alone if only the lack of a market
prevented production. 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 631, 469.2; Masterson,
supra note 40 at 321-22.
42 Robert E. Beck, Shutting-In: For What Reason and for How Long? 33 WASHBURN
L.J. 749 (1994); Masterson, supra note 40 at 323. ("The main reason for including a shut-
in clause is to give a lessee a way to continue a lease beyond its primary term where there
has bee a shut-in well.")
43 Id; 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 63 1at 400.3.
44 Moses I, supra note 40 at 376.
45 Id.
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market can be secured.46 Even where a pipeline may be available, off-
spec gas may be rcjected by the pipeline company, requiring continued
shut-in of the well. '1
There are "almost innumerable variations" in the form a shut-in
clause may take. While several Louisiana courts have addressed the
operation of the clause, the cases often turn on the specific language em-
ployed in the provision.49 This section of the paper will address select
issues that have arisen in Louisiana jurisprudence dealing with the shut-
in or in lieu paymer t clause.
Is the Payment a Royalty or a Rental?
One issue addressed by courts and other authorities in Louisiana and
elsewhere is whethcr the payment should be construed as the payment of
royalty or as a rental payment.50 The comment to Article 192 of the Lou-
isiana Mineral Code indicates that shut-in royalty clauses in leases com-
monly used in north Louisiana provide for payment regarded as the con-
structive equivalent of production when there is a shut-in well, while the
shut-in clauses of lases commonly used in south Louisiana treat a shut-
in well as a dry hole or a well incapable of commercial production with
shut-in payments operating as delay rentals.5' One author has opined
4 Id.
47 See e.g. McDoweb v. PG & E Res Co., 658 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
48 Beck, supra note 42 at 749. (Citing 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632. A
typical shut-in provision used in a Louisiana lease form reads:
Where gas from the leased premises is not sold or used, Lessee at his election from
time to time, before or after the expiration of the primary term, pay as royalty, a
sum payable in advance in the same amount and rmanner as the delay rentals pay-
able hereunder on or before the anniversary of the rental date (provided that for a
fractional part of the beginning year, proportionate royalty payment may be made
on the next succec ding payment date) and so long as such payments are made, it
shall be considere. that gas is being produced within the meaning of Paragraph . . .
..... hereof; but :;aid lease shall not be held in force for a longer period than five
years by such payment in lieu of sale of gas; and such payment shall not limit or
discharge Lessee fiom the obligation of reasonable development.
3 WILLIAMS & ME"ERS, supra note 2 § 631 at 400.1.
For other example of representative shut-in provisions see 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 2 § 631 at 339-400.3.
49 See e.g. Davis v. Laster, 138 So. 2d 559 (1962); Odom v. Union Producing Co.,.
141 So. 2d 649 (La. 1962) (on rehearing); Acquisitions Inc. v. Frontier Exploration, Inc.,
432 So. 2d (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Nortan-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp. of Texas v. Miller,
272 F. Supp. 125 (W.D. La. 1967).
50 See Davis, 138 So. 2d 558; Acquisitions, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1095; Carlisle v. United
Producing Co., 278 F.2d 893 (1Oth Cir. 1960); Morris v. First Nat'1 Bank of Mission, 249
S.W.2d 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
s1 La. Min. Code art. 182 Cmt. (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:182 Cmt. (2007)). 3 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.10 at 440.2. It should be noted, however, that numerous
courts addressing shut-in provisions in leases covering land in south Louisiana have de-
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that, given that the payment is made in lieu of production for a well full'
capable of producing, it is nonsensical to treat the well as a dry hole.
And, a leading oil and gas treatise notes that the payment should usually
go to the royalty owner because reat difficulties are created if the shut-
in payment is classified as "rent."
Indeed, the distinction carries with it significant effects. The most
profound effect of the classification as a "rental" is the possibility of
automatic termination of the lease for late payment.54 If the payment is a
royalty, rather than a rental, the lessee should be entitled to notice and an
opportunity to cure a defect in performance before the lessor may seek
cancellation." Further, the characterization of the payment as a rental or
royalty may affect who is entitled to payment56 and affect the continued
rights of royalty and possibly servitude owners.5
The leading case in Louisiana addressing the classification of a
shut-in payment is Davis v. Laster.58 The Davis court addressed the clas-
sification of shut-in payments under a lease dated January 16, 1947, af-
fecting 772 acres in DeSoto Parish, Louisiana, which had a primary term
scribed such payments as "royalties" without expressly holding that they should be char-
acterized as such. See LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile No., 88 So. 2d 377 (La. 1956)
(covering land in Vermilion Parish, Louisiana); Union Oil Co.'of Caifornia v. Touchet,
86 So. 2d 50 (La. 1956) (covering land in Vermilion Parish, Lotifsiana); Melancon v.
Texas Co., 89 So. 2d 135 (1956)(covering land in Lafourche'Parishi Louisiana); Bollinger
v. Texas Co., 95 So. 2d 132 (La. 1957) (covering land in Lafourche Parish, Louisiana);
Bernard v. Marathon Oil Co., 381 So. 2d 1286 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (covering land in
Vermilion Parish, Louisiana).
52 Moses I, supra note 40 at 379.
5 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.10 at 442.
54 Acquisitions, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1095. See also Matheson v. Placid Oil Co., 33 So. 2d
527, 529-30 (La. 1947) (citing La. Civ. Code art. 1767).
ss Acquisitions, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1095. See also Lapeze v. Amoco Production Co., 842
F.2d 132, 133, n. 3 (5th Cir. 1988); La. Min. Code arts. 137-141 (La. Rev. Stat. § 31.137-
141 (2007)).
56 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.10 at 440.1-444. In Louisiana, for ex-
ample, the holder of an executive right would be entitled to rentals but not royalties. La.
Min. Code art. 105. (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:105 (2007)). Thus, the characterization of a shut-
in payment as royalties or rentals would control who was entitled to receive payment. A
royalty owner under article 80 of the Louisiana Mineral. Code (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:80
(2007)), as owner of a non-executive right, would be entitled to the shut in payment only
if it were characterized as a royalty. See also Min. Code arts. 105 and 108. (La. Rev. Stat.
§§ 31:105, 108 (2007)).
" See LeBlanc v. Haynesville Mercantile Co., 88 So. 2d 377 (La. 1956). Compare
Union Oil Co. of Cahfornia v. Touchet, 86 So. 2d 50 (La. 1956). See also 3 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.10 at 440.2. But see La. Min. Code arts. 34 and 90 (La. Rev.
Stat. §§ 31:34, 90 (2007)) and La. Min. Code art. 34 Cmt. (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:137 Cmt.
(2007))(suggesting that the interruption of prescription should not be dependent on char-
acterization of shut-in payments as constructive production).
5 138 So. 2d 558.
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often years.59 In Se-tember 1948, the defendant lessee drilled a well (the
"Pegues No. 1 Well") on the leased premises capable of producing in
paying quantities between five and six million cubic feet of gas daily on
open flow tests conducted by the Louisiana Department of Conserva-
tion.60 The Pegues No. 1 Well was then shut-in for lack of a market.6 1 At
the time of its completion, the Pegues No. 1 Well was the only well pro-
ducing gas in the area, and no purchaser would undertake the expense of
laying a pipeline to receive and market production from this well alone.
62 The defendant lessee drilled nine additional wells on neighboring
tracts of land in an effort to find additional gas reserves, but none of the
wells were productive. 63 A second producer with neighboring leases ul-
tirnately discovered two additional gas wells in the area, and the producer
joined with the defendant to secure a gas line to the three wells.64 The
line was being laid at the time the suit was filed in February 1958.
After the completion and shutting-in of the Pegues No. 1 Well, the
defendant lessee continued to pay annual delay rentals until the expira-
tion of the primary term on January 16, 1957.66 The plaintiff lessor ac-
cepted these payments without protest. On December 28, 1956, the de-
fendant lessee tendered a check to the plaintiff lessor purporting to be a
shut-in royalty payment for the period commencing on January 16, 1957
and continuing throigh lanuary 16, 1958. Plaintiff lessor refused.the
payment and,.,by letter dated October 30, 1957, demanded that. thedlessee.
release the lease. 68 By check dated January 2, 1958, the defendant again
tendered shut-in royalties for the period from January 16, 1958 through
69January 16, 1959. The well commenced actual production on May 13,
1958.70
The pertinent provisions of the lease read:
2. Subject to the other provisions herein contained, this lease shall
be for a term of ten years from this date and as long thereafter as oil,
gas, or other minerals are produced from said lands or lands pooled
hereunder.
5 Id. at 559.
6 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
6 Id. at 559-560.
65 Id. at 560.
6 Id
67 Id
68 Id
69 Id
70 Id
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3. The royalties to be paid by lessee are:
(c) Where gas from a well producing gas only is not sold or
used because of no market or demand therefore, lessee may pay
as royalty $50.00 per well, per year, payable quarterly, and
upon such payment it will be considered that gas is being pro-
duced within the meaning of Article 2 of this contract.7
The Court of Appeal held that the lessees' failure to pay shut-in
royalties under these provisions during the primary term of the lease con-
stituted a breach of the lease for which the lessor was entitled to cancel-
lation.72 On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the defendant lessee
argued that it had the option of maintaining the lease either by paying
delay rentals or by the payment of shut-in royalties. 73 The Louisiana Su-
preme Court ultimately rejected this argument holding that the payments
under Article 3(c) were royalties and that the lessee was not permitted to
pay delay rentals when royalties were actually owed. 4
The Davis court found it significant, however, that Article 3(c) des-
ignated the shut-in payments as "royalties. 7 s Moreover, the fact that Ar-
ticle 3(c) was contained within Article 3, idficerning the payment of roy-
alties, supported the conclusion that the parties intended payments under
Article 3(c) to be royalties. The court determined that there was no
support for the argument that the language of Article 3(c) permitted the
interpretation advanced by the defendant. The court concluded that
once a well capable of producing is discovered, the lessee-is "relegated to
continuing drilling operations, or the payment of shut-in royalties, or ac-
71 Id. at 561.
72 Id.
7 Id. at 561-2. For additional cases discussing the alternative obligations of the lessee
under the shut-in clause, see Sohio Petroleum Co. v. V. S. & P. R. R., 62 So. 2d 615, 620
(La. 1952) (as discussed in Davis, lease was held by continuous drilling obligation) and
Lelong v. Richardson, 126 So. 2d 819, 824-25 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) (lease was held by
the payment of shut-in royalties).
7 Davis, 138 So. 2d at 563. Although the court held that the lessee was required to
pay shut-in rentals under Article 3(c), the court went on to find that the parties varied the
terms for performance of the shut-in royalty provision by their course of performance
under the contract and ultimately rejected the plaintiff lessor's demand for forfeiture. Id.
at 564. Note that the lessee in Davis could have argued that non-payment of royalties
does not result in automatic termination of a mineral lease; however, Davis, predates the
Louisiana Mineral Code. Prior to the enactment of the Mineral Code there was authority
that the failure to pay royalties for an extended period of time was an active breach of the
mineral lease for which a putting in default was not required. See Melancon., 89 So. 2d
135 and Bollinger, 95 So. 2d 132. See also La. Min. Code art. 137 Cmt. (La. Rev. Stat. §
31:137 Cmt. (2007)).
7s Davis, 138 So. 2d at 562.
76 Id
77 Id
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tual royalties to maintain the lease" and, only if production ceases, does
the lessee have the option of resuming the payment of delay rentals.78
The court fuither rejected the defendant lessee's alternative argu-
ment that it may resort to the payment of delay rentals after a well is
shut-in on the basis that the well ceased to produce. In rejecting this
argument, the court noted that "A shut-in well is not dry, and although
rot actually producing, it is unrealistic to say that production has ceased
within the establis;ied meaning of these words. The very purpose of the
shut-in well clause of oil and gas leases is to permit the lessees to main-
tain the lease as though it were producing."80 Shut-in payments, the court
reasoned, are a substitute for actual production. royalties and are consid-
ered as "constructive production."8' The court also found it important
that the payments were to be made quarterly as opposed to annually as
with delay rental payments.82 The court concluded that the parties had
agreed to apply rental payments to one situation and royalty payments to
another, and after production - either actual or constructive - is achieved
the lessee no longer had the option of making rental payments. 83 The
court reasoned that the only option allowed under Article 3(c) is the op-
tion to pay shut-in royalties or resume drilling operations under the terms
of the lease.84
The court recognized the importance of the characterization of the
payment as royalties stating:
[T]he fact that the shut-in payments which the lessee may make,
having been designated by the parties as royalty, allow others be-
sides the mineral owner-lessor to become entitled to these pay-
ments. In mar.y instances the mineral-owner lessor has sold royal-
ties, and the royalty owners thereby created do not enjoy the right to
participate in bonus and rentals under the lease due the mineral-
owner lessor, but these nonparticipating royalty owners do become
entitled to their acquired portion of royalties. To permit the lessees
to elect to pay rentals where royalties are due wouid be to invest
them with the power. to foreclose nonparticipating royalty owners
from receipts to which they are entitled under the lease.s
While the Davis court classified the shut-in payment therein consid-
ered as a royalty, the case hinged on the language of the provision under
78 Id.
7 Id.
80 Id
81 Id
82 Id
83 Id at 562-63.
8 Id. at 563.
85 Id
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consideration and left open the possibility that other shut-in clauses may
be given a different construction. In the more recent case of Acquisitions
Inc. v. Frontier Explorations, Inc.,86 the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of
Appeal likewise found that the shut-in provision provided for the pay-
ment of royalty as distinguished from rental. However, this court again
declined to hold that all shut-in payments should be considered royalties.
Instead, the Acquisitions Inc. court, like the court in Davis, was careful to
preserve the right of contracting parties to determine the nature of this
provision through their individual choice of language." While a leading
treatise on oil and gas law notes that the payments should generally be
treated as royalty,88 care should be taken in determining whether a
unique shut-in clause should be interpreted as a royalty or a rental. The
careful drafting of shut-in provisions is necessary to ensure that there is
no doubt as to the nature of the right involved.
Triggering the Shut-In Clause: Is there Production in Paying
Quantities?
Another issue which has arisen in relation to shut-in payments is
how much production is necessary to trigger the operation of a shut-in
clause. As detailed in Section I hereof, in order to preserve a lease
through actual production, production must be achieved in paying or
commercial quantities. The payment of a shut-in royalty is viewed as
payment for "constructive production." Thus, it is generally understood
that a shut-in well must be capable of achieving commercial produiction
in order to take advantage of a shut-in payment provision." Indeed, even
when the provision fails to state that the well must have the capacity to
produce in paying or commercial quantities, it is generally thought that
payment of shut-in royalties will not hold the lease unless the well is ac-
tually capable of producing in paying quantities.90 Louisiana case law
supports this proposition.91
How and When Must Production in Paying Quantities Be
Proved?
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal addressed the need
to show that a shut-in well is capable of producing in paying quantities.
86 432 So. 2d 1095.
87 Id. at 1098. (Citing article 3 of the Louisiana Mineral Code (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:3
(2007)), under which parties remain free to contract as they see fit unless doing so is
expressly or impliedly prohibited or contrary to public policy).
88 3 WILLLAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.10 at 442.
89 Id. at 407; Moses 1, supra note 40 at 376.
9 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.3 at 407.
91 See Taylor v. Kimbell, 54 So. 2d I (La. 1951); Webb v. Hardage Corp., 471 So. 2d
889 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); Auzene v. Lawrence Oil Co., 179 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1965).
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In Webb .v. Hardage Corp.,9 2 the court explained that the term "produc-
tion" as used in royalty and shut-in royalty provisions must be under-
stood in the context of Louisiana Mineral Code article 124 (La. Rev.
Stat. 31:124). As detailed in Section I, article 124 provides that when a
lease is being preserved by production such production must be in paying
quantities and provides the basic factors that a court must consider when
determining whether commercial production exists.93 Reading article 124
in conjunction with the terms of the leases at issue in Webb,-the. court
concluded that the leases could only extend beyond their primary terms if
the wells were c.pable of producing in paying quantities 94 The court
found that the lessee bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of
evidence that, prior to the expiration of the primary term of the lease or
the continuous drilling operation term of the lease, a well was completed
and surface tested and that the well was demonstrably capable of produc-
ing in paying quantities at that time. 95
In Webb, the lessee brouPht in three wells one month before the ex-
piration of the primary term.9 The wells were cored, logged, casing was
set, the wells perforated for oi6duction, and the formation fracked; how-
ever, the only surface testing that the lessee performed was a flare test
lasting only four or five hours.97 The flare did not comply with the state-
required regulatory.surface prpduction test, which consists of a. quantita-
tive measuremerit of gas production over a twenty-four hour perobd and
which is recluired to be done within a few days after a wl is drilled.98
After the short flare test, the lessee shut-in the wells for lack of a mar-
ket.99 The lessee tendered shut-in royalties, which were rejected by the
lessors.'o The lessors subsequently notified the lessee in writing of its
noncompliance wiih the lease, but the lessee took no further steps to test
production, until two years later when it performed initial regulatory sur-
face tests on one of the wells.'0 When the lessee attempted to perform
the regulatory surface test on another well, its company officials were
escorted from the site by a sheriffs deputy called by the lessors.'o2
9 471 So. 2d 889.
9 Id at 891-92.
9 Id. at 892.
95 Id.
9 Id. at 890.
9 Id at 890-91.
9 Id. at 890.
10 Id. at 890-91.
10' Id at 8991.
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Thereafter, the lessors filed suit seeking a declaration that the leases had
terminated. 03
Although the lessor generally has the burden of proving that a lease
has terminated, the court determined that an exception existed in this
situation.1'4 Without expressly establishing a bright-line test for deter-
mining the productive capacity of a gas well, 05 the court found that gen-
erally the initial potential surface test required by the Louisiana Depart-
ment of Conservation is sufficient to carry the lessee's burden that the
well is capable of commercial production.'06 The regulatory surface test
is performed only days after the well is completed under standard condi-
tions, over a twenty-four hour period, and is witnessed by a representa-
tive of the Louisiana Office of Conservation.107 The test is a prerequisite
for having the well classified as an oil or gas well and for obtaining an
allowable and the authority to sell oil or gas from the well.'0o The test
should be conducted during the primary or continuous production period
of the lease in order to thereafter continue the lease through the payment
of shut-in royalties.1'" "Without such test the status of the well would
ordinarily remain uncertain while the well is shut-in.""t0
Noting the inconclusive results of the logs and cores on the subject
wells, the limited flaring of the wells, and the poor production history in
the field, the court in Webb ultimately concluded that the lessee had in-
sufficient evidence during the primary term to prove that the wells drilled
were capable of producing in paying quantities." The court found it of
no moment that the one production test that had been performed revealed
that the well was indeed capable of producing in paying quantities con-
cluding that such production capacity must be established during the
primary or continuous operations period.1 2 The court found that a "les-
see should not be able to rely on the shut-in clause to hold a lease beyond
the primary term where the well's capacity to produce in paying quanti-
103 ki
'0 Id. at 892.
1os The court held open the possibility that production potential could be proved
through other evidence, such as the results of logs and cores, the flaring of wells for ex-
tended periods of time, and the favorable production history of the wells completed in the
same productive zone in the field. However, the court stressed the importance of testing
of surface production and indicted a strong preference that a lessee be able to present this
type of proof. Id
106 Id
107 id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id
"' Idat 892-93.
11Id at 893.
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ties cannot be determined until further testing and procedures are carried
out at some latet date." 113
Although Webb did not establish a mandatory evidentiary rule re-
quiring the lessee to establish the ability of a shut-in well to produce in
commercial quantities through surface testing in compliance with the
Louisiana Department of Conservation's statutory and regulatory
scheme, a lessee would be well advised to complete surface testing dur-
ing the primary or continuous drilling terms of its lease before shutting in
a well. In the absence of such test, a lessee may rely on other evidence to
establish commercial production but runs the risk of having a court reject
its proof as insufficient.
Triggering the Shut-In Clause: Does De Minimus Production of
Other Substances Prevent the Application of a Shut-In Clause?
The issue o: whether a well is producing in paying quantities arises
in another context relating to the shut-in clause: whether a well may be
maintained by the payment of shut-in rentals when the shut-in well pro-
duces both gas and other liquid hydrocarbons. As noted previously, most
shut-in clauses are applicable only to gas wells.1 4 Variations of the
clause include such language as:
"While there is a gas well on this lease but gas is not being sold or
used";
"Where gas from a well producing gas only is not sold or used";
"For all wells on the said lands where gas only or primarily is
found";
"Gas from a well or wells, capable of producing gas only";" 5
The question thus arises as to the meaning of the term "gas" or "gas
only." In Louisiana, a shut-in well producing both gas and liquid hydro-
carbons is nonetheless a "gas" well or a well producing "gas only" when
the liquid producis are not being produced in paying quantities.
This question was addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Davis v. Laster."6 In Davis, the lessor contended that, because the well
produced condensate, as well as gas, it was not "producing gas only"
under the terms of the lease."' 7 The court accepted for the sake of argu-
ment that liquid condensate was not "gas" for the purposes of the shut-in
provision;" 8 however, it recognized that almost all gas wells produce
Id.
11 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.3 at 402; Masterson, supra note 40 at
323.
" 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.3 at 402.
116 138 So. 2d 558.
17 Id. at 567-68.
" The argument was made by the lessee that, because the condensate was produced in
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some liquid condensate." 9 "A holding that the constructive production
provision applies only to wells producing no liquid condensate would
render the provision almost nugatory."l 20 Given the purpose of the provi-
sion is to maintain the lease in the absence of actual production, the need
for the protection still exists when a well is producing only a negligible
amount of condensate.121 The Davis court thus held that a well produced
"gas only" unless it was capable of producing condensate in paying or
commercial quantities.122 The burden of proof is on the party attacking
the lease to show that the well was capable of producing products other
than gas in paying quantities, and because the plaintiff in Davis had
failed to present any evidence to support its attack, the court rejected its
claim. 23
Triggering the Shut-In Clause: Is the Well Shut-In, and What Is
the Reason for the Shut-In?
The issues sometimes arise of whether the well is actually shut-in
and whether the reason for the shut-in is covered by the shut-in clause.
This issue is largely controlled by the specific language contained in the
shut-in provision. Most shut-in well clauses provide for the payment of
royalties when a gas from a shut in well is "not being sold or used." 24
But again, there are innumerable variations of the shut-in clause.125 Some
a gaseous state and later separated at the wellhead, the condensate was gas for the pur-
poses of the shut-in clause. Because it was unnecessary to the ultimate decision of the
case, the court did not address whether the condensate produced by the well should be
classified as something other than gas. Ostensibly, an argument still exists after Davis
that condensate should be classified as gas for the purposes of shut-in provisions. The
court recognized that:
The Commissioner of the Department of Conservation has classified the well as a
gas well. The Legislature, in another context, has defined 'Oil' and 'Gas' as fol-
lows:
(4) 'Oil' means crude petroleum oil, and other hydrocarbons, regardless of
gravity, which are produced at the well head in liquid form by ordinary pro-
duction methods.
(5) 'Gas' means all natural gas, including casinghead gas, and all other hy-
drocarbons not defined as oil in paragraph (4) above. LSA-R.S. 30:3.
Davis, 138 So. 2d at 568.
" 138 So. 2d at 567, quoting Vernon v. Union Co. of California, 270 F.2d 441 (5th
Cir. 1959) and citing SUMMERS, supra note 2 § 299.
120 Id. at 567, quoting Vernon v. Union Co. of Calfornia, 270 F.2d at 441.
121 Id. at 567-568.
122 Id. at 568.
123 Id.
124 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS supra note 2 § 632.4 at 410.
125 Beck, supra note 42 at 752; Nancy Forbis, The Shut-In Royalty Clause: Balancing
the Interests ofLessors and Lessees, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1129, 1133 (1989). For examples of
variations, see 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS supra note 2 § 632.4, at 410-11.
186-
17
Hebert: A Review of Selected Lease Clauses
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2007
clauses contain no express reason for shut-in.126 Others refer expressly to
the lack of a mE.rket; others refer to lack of an adequate market.127 Still
others refer to transportation difficulties, availability of a pipeline, force
majeure, or othe problems.128
In Melancon v. Texas Co.,' 29 and its companion case Bollinger v.
Texas Co.,o30 the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the effect of a
shut-in clause allowing shut-in payments when gas is "not being sold or
used." In both cases, the lessee paid shut in royalties even though the
well was open for production into the lessee's fuel line and gas and dis-
tillate were bein3, used by the lessee and others.' 3' On various intermit-
tent occasions, the well was temporarily shut-in, and it was during these
occasions that tl e lessee paid shut-in royalties.132 Based on these facts,
the court held that the lessees breached the leases for non-payment of
production royalties for gas being used by the lessee and other opera-
tors. 33 The court found that the shut-in clause had no application when
gas was being ued by the lessee and others. The court held that the les-
see could not pay shut-in royalties when production royalties were actu-
ally due.'34
In Nordan-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp. of Texas v. Miller,'35 the court
construed a simi ar provision in a lease providing for payment of in lieu
(or shut-in) roya ties reading: "when a market cannot be secured for gas
from a well or well producing gas only, and such gas is not being used or
sold on or'off the premises"' 3 6 The lessee in Nordan-Lawton had negoti-
ated a favorable gas purchase contract, obtained a certificate from the
Federal Power Commission, and had the facilities available to transport
production.' 3 7 The lessor, nonetheless, contended that the wells involved
were shut-in for lack of a market, and thus, shut-in royalties were
owed.'" The lessee countered that a market had been obtained when it
126 Beck, supra note 42 at 752; Forbis, supra note 125 at I133.
127 Beck, supra note 42 at 752; Forbis, supra note 125 at 1133.
128 Beck, supra note 42 at 752.
129 89 So. 2d 135 (La. 1956).
30 95 So. 2d 132 (La. 1958).
1I1 Melancon, 89 So. 2d at 137-38; Bollinger, 95 So. 2d at 134.
132 Melancon, 89 So. 2d at 138; Bollinger, 95 So. 2d at 134.
1n Melancon, 89 So. 2d 135; Bollinger, 95 So. 2d 132.
134 Interestingly, in Bollinger the shut-in payments exceeded that which would have
been owed for production royalties; the court, however, held that such payments did not
satisfy the terms of the lease. Bollinger, 95 So. 2d at 136.
135 272 F.Supp 125 (W.D. La. 1967) affd, 403 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1968).
136 Id. at 130.
1n Id. at 131.
138 Id.
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secured the gas purchase contract and that the wells were shut-in for
other operational and economical reasons beneficial to both the lessee
and the lessor."' Specifically, the lessee alleged that evidence from the
shut-in wells indicated fewer reserves than originally estimated. 140 As a
result, both lessee and lessor would have realized lower profits from the
lease as a whole if the wells were placed on production.14 1 The district
court agreed with the lessee's argument concluding that the wells were
not shut-in for lack of a market but for other operational reasons, and
thus, no shut-in royalties were owed.142
In McDowell v. PG & E Resources Co.,143 the court construed a
more detailed shut-in provision that allowed the lessee to make shut-in
royalty payments "by reason of force majeure or lack of either a market
at the well or wells or of an available pipeline outlet in the field." 44 The
facts of the McDowell case are somewhat complex and warrant detailed
treatment.
In McDowell, the producing well on the lease produced only "wet"
gas, which had to be combined with "dry" gas from another well to meet
the specifications for the available pipeline in the field.14 5 In the early
1990s the well from which the dry gas was obtained ceased to produce,
and the pipeline company refused to accept the unmixed wet gas from
the producing well on the lease.146 In March of 1990, the lessee was re-
quired to shut-in the well and, thereafter, undertook numerous steps to
reestablish a market, including the drilling and reworking of wells from
which it hoped to obtain dry gas.' 4 7 The lessee entertained gas purchase
offers by two different purchasers, but the construction of a pipeline
would have been necessary.148 By December 4, 1990, the lessee reached
an agreement with a gas carrier to purchase the production, but no pipe-
line was available at that time. 149 In January 1991, the lessee tendered
shut-in royalties in accordance with the lease provisions.150 On April 28,
"' Id. at 136-37.
140 id
141 Id. This case presents the unusual situation in which shut-in royalties were owed
even though the lease is otherwise being held by production. This issue will be discussed
in greater detail in Section II.E., infra.
142 id
143 658 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995).
'" Id. at 782, n. 5.
145 d t7 1
146 id
1 Id.
148 id
149 id
no0 Id. at 781, n. 2.
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1991, the lessee placed the well back on line after the construction of the
pipeline, and in May 1991, the lessee resumed paying production royal-
ties.'
Approximately one month prior to the resumption of production, the
landowners executed another lease in favor of a third party covering the
same lands as cefendant's lease.152 Thereafter, the new lessee mailed
demand letters to the defendant demanding release of its leases. 5 3 When
the defendant refused, the landowner filed suit claiming that the leases
had expired under their terms as a result of cessation of production for
more than 90-days.154
The plaintiff landowner contended that gas purchase offers made in
the 1990s demonstrated that a market existed at that time and precluded
the application of the shut-in royalty provision. 55 Focusing on the pre-
cise language of the shut-in clause, the court in McDowell rejected the
plaintiffs argument.'56 According to the shut-in provision, "absent the
availability of a pipeline, only a market 'at the well' would negate a shut-
in situation." Because the offers from the gas purchasers required the
installation of a pipeline, they did not end the shut-in situation.'5 "[T]he
mere existence of potential buys in the area did not suffice."' 5 8 Rather,
until the "market' was brought to the well by the installation of the pipe-
line, the shut-in clause was operative.'s9
Although no cases in Louisiana directly address shut-in clauses con-
taining permissible grounds for shutting in a well, it poses another inter-
esting issue. Scholarly writings suggest that attention should be paid to
the possibility of its inclusion when drafting the clause. 60 There may be
persuasive reasons to include a provision in an oil and gas lease that al-
lows some discretion on the part of the lessee when shutting-in a well,
but if such provision is included, it is advisable that it should include ref-
erence to "the les see's good faith judgment that it is unadvisable to pro-
duce and sell products for the time being."' 6 '
When Must the Shut-In Payment Be Made?
151 Id. at 781.
132 id
'" Id at 782.
' Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id
158 id
159 id.
l6 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.4 at 411; Beck supra note 42 at 766-68.
161 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.4 at 411; Beck supra note 42 at 766-68
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Another important variation of shut-in payment clauses is the provi-
sion concerning the timing of such payments; these variations bring with
them attendant problems.162 In some instances, the contract is silent as to
the date upon which payment is to be made. It has been suggested that
the "ultimate test" for timeliness is whether actual production on the date
of payment would have been sufficient to maintain the lease in force. 63
This seems a dangerous test to rely on, particularly if such payment is
later deemed a rental and not a royalty.'64 There is authority in Louisiana
that, absent a specific requirement that payment is to be made in ad-
vance, no such requirement exists. 65 Nonetheless, caution may dictate
that in instances of doubt, where the contract is otherwise silent, payment
should be made in advance of shutting in the well.'6 6
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Odom v. Union Produc-
ing Co., 6 7 involved a lease granted on May 26, 1947 with a ten year
primary term.'68 On May 1, 1957, a well completed on a neighboring
tract was shut-in, and a unit including a portion of the plaintiff's land was
formed on May 20, 1957.169 The lessee tendered a shut-in royalty pay-
ment on June 11, 1957 - after the well was shut-in and after the primary
term expired.170 The lease provided that the payments were to be "pay-
able quarterly" but contained no express provision that the payments
were to be made in advance or at any other specific time within the quar-
ter. ' Relying on the general provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code as
well as.other authorities relating to leases, the courtconcluded on rehear-
ing that the payment was properly made at any time within the quarter.1
72
162 Barney Hebert, Who Gets Paid When? The Timing of the Shut-In Gas Royalty
Payment, 8 Miss. C. L. REv. 175, 184 (1988); 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 §
632.6 at 418.
163 Howard, supra note 40 at 6. (Citing Moses, Shut-In Gas Well Problems, 33 Miss
L.J. 267(1962)).
164 See discussion in Section II. A. herein, supra. If the payment is characterized as a
royalty, the lessor may be obligated to provide notice and an opportunity to cure in the
event of an untimely payment. La. Min. Code art. 136 (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:137 (2007));
See also Lapeze v. Amoco Production Co., 842 F.2d 132, 133, n. 3 (5th Cir. 1988). Con-
versely, if the payment is characterized as a rental, untimely payment may trigger an
express resolutory condition under which the lease automatically terminates. See Acquisi-
tions, Inc. v. Frontier Explorations, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1095 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
165 Odom v. Union Producing Co., 141 So. 2d 649, 664 (La. 1962) (on rehearing).
'6 Howard, supra note 40 at 6; 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.4 at 418;
Hebert, supra note 162 at 7.
167 141 So. 2d 649.
161 Id. at 650.
169 Id at 664.
170 Id.
171 Id.
'7 Id., citing La. Civ. Code art. 2057; Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 198
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It should be noted that the law in Texas is in conflict with Odom.
Under the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Freeman v. Magnolia Pe-
troleum Co., to avoid lease termination and to extend a lease beyond the
primary term by paying shut-in royalties,,the lessee must tender shut-in
royalties before 1he end of the primary term if the shut-in provision is
silent.'73 The Freman court reasoned that, because there was neither
actual nor constructive production at the end of the primary term, the
lease terminated inder its own terms.17 4 Because Louisiana does not fol-
low the doctrine of stare decisis,'" there is the possibility that a Louisi-
ana court later examining this issue could adopt similar reasoning to that
of the Freeman court. Thus, lessees in Louisiana should remain cautions
when paying shut-in royalties to maintain a lease beyond its primary
term or continuouts drilling term.
Where the contract specifies the timing for payments, it is incum-
bent upon the lessee to pay in accordance with the lease provisions. In
Bennett v. Sinclair,'7 6 the plaintiff lessor declined to cash a shut-in roy-
alty check which purported to represent shut-in royalties for a period of
six months on the basis that it was not paid in accordance with the terms
of the lease, which provided that royalties were payable "quarterly." 77
Plaintiff further c.aimed that the shut-in payment was premature because
the payment was designated for a period beginning May 29, 1965, when
the well was actually completed on June 13, 1965. 178 The court found
that the comipletioh diit'e~as'a "mere technicality" as to whether comple-
tion occurred at-the time the Christmas tree was installed or whether it
occurred at the time the well was perforated; as such, it did not affect the
timeliness of paynent.'79 In addressing whether payment for a six month
period constituted performance under the lease, the court noted that "or-
dinarily shut-in royalties should be tendered in accordance with the terms
of the lease."' 80 However, because the lessor could show no prejudice
La. 101, 3 So. 2d 28S (La. 1941); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 511 at 315; 32 AM.
JUR. Landlord and Tenant § 462 at 378; 126 A.L.R. 565.
17 171 S.W.2d 339 (1943).
174 Id. at 342. For a more complete discussions of Freeman v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., and other cases f allowing its reasoning, see 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 §
633.3 at 465-470, and Hebert, supra note 162 at 184-85.
us Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 128 (La. 2000)("Louisiana courts have
ftequently noted that cur civilian tradition does not recognize the doctrine of stare decisis
in our state.") See 21so Albert Tate, Jr., Civilian Methodology in Louisiana, 44
TUL.L.REv. 673, 678 (1970).
76 405 F.2d 1005 (Sth Cir. 1968).
1" Id. at 1008.
178 id
1' Id.
Isod
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from the small overpayment of royalties, the lessor was denied the rem-
edy of lease cancellation.' 8 '
The above described difficulties in determining the timing for pay-
ment of a shut-in royalty may be avoided by the careful drafting of
clauses containing such provisions. Consideration should be given to the
inclusion of a grace period or other specific language that would allow
the lessee to make payment after the well is shut-in even when the lease
is beyond the primary term.
Is the Shut-In Payment Necessary if the Lease is Being Held by
Production?
Many shut-in provisions do not require the payment of shut-in roy-
alties when the lease is otherwise being held by production. 8 2 And the
jurisprudence in Louisiana has established that, in the absence of a provi-
sion to the contrary, there is no obligation to pay shut-in royalties when a
lease is being held by actual production. 83 But, a careful analysis of the
individual shut-in provision should be made before concluding that shut-
in payments are not expressly required.
In Nordan-Lawton Oil & Gas Corp. of Texas v. Miller,184 the court
held that the defendant was required to pay shut-in royalties for a shut-in
well even though actual production attributable to the lease was being
obtained.'85 The Nordan-Lawton case was distinguished in Bernard v.
181 Id. The court distinguished Bollinger v. Texas Co., in which the lessee paid shut-it
royalties that exceeded the amounts owed as production royalties. In Bollinger, though
numerous demands had been made by the lessor for payment of production royalties, the
lessee engaged in an intentional course of conduct of withholding royalties in an effort to
obtain a favorable amendment to the lease with lessor. Id.
It should also be noted that the Bennett decision predates the Louisiana Mineral
Code. A lessee would now be entitled to written notice and an opportunity to cure im-
proper payment of royalties before the lessor would be afforded the opportunity to seek
lease cancellation. La. Min. Code art. 137. (La Rev. Stat. § 31:137 (2007)).
182 See e.g., Bernard v. Marathon Oil Co., 381 So. 2d 1286 (La. App. 3d Cir 1980);
Bennett v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 405 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1968); See also 3 WILLIAMS &
MEYERS, supra note 2 § 632.14 at 453. As noted above, a lessee may also be excused
from paying shut-in royalties when the lease is being maintained by continuous drilling
operations. See Davis, 138 So. 2d 558; Sohio Petroleum Co., 62 So. 2d at 620 and may
also be maintained by force majeure, cf Webb v. Hardage Corp., 471 So. 2d 889 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1985) and LeSage v. Union Producing Co., 176 So. 2d 777 (La.App. 2d Cir.
1965) rev'don other grounds, 184 So. 2d 727 (La. 1966).
183 Bernard, 381 So. 2d at 1286 ("Where there is actual production in paying quanti-
ties, the necessity for constructive production does not exist."); Bennett, 405 F.2d at 1005
("Where there is actual production attributable to a mineral lease . . . there is no obliga-
tion to pay shut-in royalties in the event another commercial capable of producing in
paying quantities, is drilled on the lease premises").
' 272 F.Supp. 125 (W.D. La. 1967).
1ss Id
-192-
23
Hebert: A Review of Selected Lease Clauses
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2007
Marathon Oil Co., 186 on the basis that the specific lease language in Nor-
dan-Lawton contained an express provision that obliged the lessee to pay
shut-in royalties in the event of a shut-in well, even when there was ac-
tual production attributable to the leased property.'8 7 No such provision
was contained in the lease in Bernard; thus, the Bernard court held that
there was no obligation to pay shut-in royalties when the lease was being
held by productior..
As demonstrated by the Nordan-Lawton and Bernard cases, differ-
ent shut-in provisions may result in different obligations to pay shut-in
royalties in the event that the lease is otherwise being held by production.
Thus, careful conideration should be given in both drafting and inter-
preting these provisions.
Does Payment of Shut-In Royalties Affect the Lessee's Implied
Obligations?
A final issue to be examined under the shut-in clause is what, if any,
affect it has on the lessee's implied obligations to market and develop the
leased premises. The issue is often raised that it is possible that the lessee
may extend the lease indefinitely by the payment of shut-in royalties. In
older lease forms, the shut-in royalty provision often contained no
term.18 In more modern lease forms, the parties are likely to state that
shut-in payments will maintain the lease only for a specified period of
time.'89 Even if the shut-in clause has no term, scholarly writings uni-
formly agree that the implied duty to market gas would limit the lessee's
ability to hold the lease indefinitely by paying shut-in royalties alone.1 90
Indeed, Professor Masterson refutes the suggestion that the shut-in roy-
alty clause is unfair to the lessor because it allows the lessee to hold the
lease indefinitely it the following frequently quoted passage:
A complete ar swer to the argument that a shut-in clause is unfair to
a lessor because it would allow a lessee to hold a lease forever with-
out producing, is that the lessee owes a duty to be diligent in search-
ing for a market; for a breach of which he is liable for damages,
cancellation or an alternative decree. Similarly the shut-in well does
not excuse the lessee from the usual implied covenants to further
381 So. 2d 1286.
Id. at 1289.
11 Leslie Moses, Recent Problems in Connection with Shut-In Gas Royalty Provisions
in Oil and Gas Leases, 10 Lov. L. REV. 1, 7 (1961) ("Moses II").
1 Beck, supra note 42 at 783.
190 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 §§ 632.13 at 447-48 and 634.2 at 483-83;
Beck, supra note 42 at '779-84; Forbis, supra note 125 at 1147-48; Moses II, supra note
188 at 7-8; Masterson, sapra note 40 at 330.
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develop, to offset and otherwise conduct himself as would a reason-
able and prudent lessee under the same or similar circumstances.'91
Louisiana case law confirms that the implied obligation to reasona-
bly market gas and develop the leased premises is not excused when a
lessor is receiving shut-in royalty payments. 192
In Lelong v. Richardson,'93 the court held that a lessee must comply
with its marketing and development obligations when maintaining a
lease by paying shut-in royalties.194 Plaintiff in Lelong granted to the de-
fendants a mineral lease dated July 8, 1957.195 The lessees began drilling
operations before the expiration of the primary term and completed a
well capable of producing gas on November 27, 1957.196 At the time of
the well's completion there was no available market for the gas, and the
well was shut-in.'97 On December 6, 1957,. the plaintiff lessor executed
an act ratifying the lease, and on January 17; 1958, the lessees tendered a
shut-in royalty payment pursuant to the lease. 98
On May 6, 1958, the plaintiff lessor sent a demand letter to the les-
sees demanding additional drilling within sixty days or cancellation of
the lease.'99 The defendant lessee complied with plaintiffs demand, be-
ginning additional drilling operations in June 1958, but due to a blow-out
and resulting difficulties with the second well, the lessees were unable to
complete the well until September 1958.200 Like the first well, this well
was completed as a gas well for which there was no market.20' The les-
sees tendered shut-in royalty payments for both wells on January 2,
1959.202
The record established "that lessees, from and since the completion
of [the first well] in November 1957, in good faith exerted every reason-
able and diligent effort in attempting to produce a market for the gas." 203
In March or April 1959, a gas purchaser expressed interest in purchasing
191 Masterson, supra note 40 at 330.
192 Lelong v. Richardson, 126 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
19 id.
194 Id.
-Id. at 82 1.
196 Id.
197 id
200 Id. at 821-22.
201 Id. at 822.
202 Id.
203 Id.
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gas from the area in which the lease was located.204 After protracted ne-
gotiations, this purchaser began buying gas from the first well on No-
vember 1, 1959.2)5
On April 29, 1959, the plaintiff lessor sent a demand to some but
not all of its lessees notifying them that he considered the lease to be
terminated for the failure of the lessees to comply with their obliga-
tions.206 The plaintiff enclosed with the demand the shut-in. royalty
checks, none of which had been cashed.207 Plaintiff filed suit seeking
cancellation on June 1, 1959.
The court noted that, at the time suit was filed, the defendants were
"ready, willing and able to prosecute operations for the development of
the leased premises in accordance with reliable geological informatio'n
and approved business practices in the industry." 208 The Lelong court
found that the case ultimately turned on whether the lessees failed to
adequately develop the leased premises.209 The court analyzed the les-
see's developmert obligation in connection with its marketing obligation
- apparently finding the two obligations interconnected.
The court found that there was no real question that there was no
market for the wells at the time of their completions.210 When other wells
were completed by other operators in the area, a market was created. 21'
And, it was clear that the lessees intended to continue the lease in effect
through the payment of shut-in royalties. 212 The court concluded that,
under the circum:;tances of the case, the lessees had not violated their
implied duty to develop the leased premises. 213
The court found it important that the wells were located in a wild-
cat area, where no market for gas was located.214 The lessees diligently
attempted to crea;:e a market for the existing wells, but no market was
available for more than a year after the wells' completion, and a market
was not formally secured by the execution of a contract until two years
after such completion.215 Following the negotiation of the gas purchase
"94 Id.
2 o Id.
2 1 Id
207 id
208 id
'0 Id at 823.
2 0 Idat 824.
211 id
2.2 Id. at 825.
2' Id. at 830.
214 id
215 id
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contract, the lessees were prevented from developing the leased premises
by the institution of the lawsuit for cancellation and forfeiture of the
lease.216 Under these facts, the court found that the lessees complied with
the duty to develop the leased premises. 217 However, the court noted that
the continued validity of the lease would depend on the lessees' future
actions, which in view of the existing market would require prompt and
diligent development of the leased premises.218
Under Lelong, a lessor faced with a shut-in royalty clause contain-
ing an indefinite term for its application may resort to the lessee's im-
plied obligations to market and develop for release when a lessee at-
tempts to hold the lease by the payment of shut-in royalties alone without
making efforts to secure a market or further develop the leased premises.
IV. Selected Issues under the Pugh Clause
Another commonly used provision in Louisiana Mineral leases is
the so-called Pugh clause. The clause relates to pooling and unitization
and provides that drilling or production from a unit or units will maintain
the lease in force only as to that area included within such unit or
units.219 Under Louisiana law, the drilling of a well which produces in
paying quantities on leased premises during the primary term of the lease
maintains the lease as to all lands covered by the lease in the absence of a
Pugh Clause.220 Additionally, operations on land unitized with the leased
premises sufficient to maintain the lease according to its terms will pre-
serve the lease in its entirety. 221 This general rule is based on the notion
that a mineral lease is indivisible. 222 In Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., a
case in which a portion of the leased premises was placed in a unit and
production was obtained from unitized land other than the leased land,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the:
216 Id.
217 Id
218 Id.
219 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 at 849.
220 La. Min. Code art. 114 (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:114 (2007)). This is not the general rule
in some states, such as Oklahoma, which have enacted a statutory provision, sometimes
referred to as a statutory Pugh clause, providing that production within a unit does not
hold the portion of the leased premises outside the unit. Okl. Stat. Ann. 52, § 87.1 (2006).
To illustrate, the Oklahoma's version of the statutory Pugh clause states: "[i]n case of a
spacing unit of one hundred sixty (160) acres or more, no oil and/or gas leasehold interest
outside the spacing unit involved may be held by production from the spacing unit more
than ninety (90) days beyond expiration of the primary term of the lease." Id. Practitio-
ners should refer to state law to determine whether their state has enacted such a statute.
221 La. Min. Code art. 114 (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:114 (2007)).
222 Id. at Cmt. See also Smith v. Carter Oil Co., 104 F.Supp. 463, 466 (W.D. La.
1952).
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drilling of a producing well in the unit . .. within the primary term
of the lease complies with the obligation to drill assumed by the les-
see under the terms and provisions of the lease and production in
paying quantities from such a well constitutes production from all
the property described in the lease and maintains the lease in full
force and ef Fect. 223
However, tl e Louisiana Mineral Code provides that parties are
free to contract for a result different from that created by the general
rule in the Louisiana Mineral Code.224 Parties to oil and gas leases
often do this by inserting a so-called "Pugh clause" into their
leases. 225 The Pugh clause is named after Lawrence C. Pugh, of
Crowley, Louisiana, who is said to have included the clause in a
lease to reverse the effects of Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co. 22 6 There are
various versions of Pugh clauses, but in its basic form, the Pugh
clause provides that production from any part of a unit preserves the,
lease only as to the leased land included in the unit.227 The clause, in
effect, severs the lease into parts that must be separately main-
tained. 228 The Pugh clause usually provides that the portion of the
leased land not included in a producing unit may be maintained by
the payment of delay rentals or Pugh clause rentals.229
The Pugh clause is advantageous to and protective of the les-
sor's interests in reasonable development of the leased premises. 230 It
was designed to ":?revent undesirable legal consequences of unitizing
for the landowner-lessor." 231 "The main purpose of a Pugh clause is
to protect the landowner-lessor from the anomaly of having the en-
tire property held under lease by production from a very small por-
tion ... "232 In the absence of a Pugh clause, an entire lease could be
.2 31 So. 2d 10 (L;. 1947). See also LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil & Refining Co., 49 So.
2d 855 (La. 1950).
224 La. Min. Code art 3 (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:3 (2007)); La. Min. Code art. 114 Cmt.
(La. Rev. Stat. § 31:114 Cmt. (2007)).
225 La. Min. Code art. 114 Cmt. (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:114 Cmt. (2006)); See also Will-
Drill Resources, Inc. v Huggs, 738 So. 2d 1196, 1199 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999).
226 4 WILLIAMS & M EYERS, supra note 2 § 669.14.
2Z7 Will-Drill Resources, Inc., 738 So. 2d at 1199.
228 4 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 669.14 at 47.
229 Fremaux v. Buie, 212 So. 2d 148, 150 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
2:0 Patrick H. Martin, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases: Past, Present, &
Future, 33 WBN. L.J. (39, 647 (1994). See also Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon, 961
F. 2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1992).
231 Fremaux, 212 So, 2d at 151.
232 EARL A. BROWN, EARL A. BROWN, JR. & LAWRENCE T. GILLASPIA, THE LAW OF OIL
AND GAS LEASES, § 17-14[7] (2d. 2006) (quoting Will-Drill Resources, Inc., 738 So. 2d at
1199). See also Sandefir, 961 F. 2d at 1209.
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preserved by payment to the landowner of a potentially small portion
of the royalty which is attributable to the lessor's interest in the
unit. 3 In such situation, the lessor whose lease did not contain a
Pugh clause could only terminate the lease by proving that the lessee
failed to develop and operate the leased property as a reasonably
pnident operator.234
Because Pugh clauses are commonly included in oil and gas
leases, there is a substantial amount Louisiana jurisprudence address-
ing Pugh clauses. This case law raises several interesting issues re-
garding the activation and application of a Pugh clause.
What Constitutes a Unit for Purposes of a Pugh Clause?
Voluntary versus Compulsory Units
In Smith v. Carter Oil Co., the Court held that forced pooling of a
lease pursuant to an order of the Commissioner of Conservation did not
divide the obligations of the lease under the Pugh clause in question. 35
The Pugh clause was contained within a pooling clause immediately fol-
lowing provisions giving to the lessee the power to pool or unitize the
leased premises and setting out the procedures for such declaratory pool-
ing. The Pugh clause considered by the court in Smith reads:
If operations be conducted on or production be secured from land in
such pooled unit other than land covered by this lease, it shall have
the same effect as to maintaining lessee's rights in force hereunder
as if such operations were on or such production from land covered
hereby, except that its effect shall be limited to the land covered
thereby which is included in such pooled unit. This lease, during
any period in which it is being so maintained as to part of the land
covered hereby, may be maintained as to the remainder in any man-
ner elsewhere provided for herein; provided, that if it be maintained
by rental payment, the rentals may be reduced in proportion to the
number of acres in such unit or units as to which this lease is being
maintained by drilling operations or production.236
2 BROWN, supra note 232 § 17-14[7].
234 La. Min. Code art. 122 (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:122 (2007)).
235 104 F. Stipp. 463, 466 (W.D. La. 1952). See also Odoin v. Union Producing Co.,
129 So. 2d 530, 536-537 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), rev'd, 141 So. 2d 649 (La. 1961)(on
rehearing). The Louisiana Supreme Court originally affirmed the decision of the appellate
court holding that the Pugh clause did not apply to compulsory units created by the
Commissioner of Conservation. However, on rehearing, the Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court without again addressing whether or not a Pugh clause applies to compul-
sory unitization. The court's holding that payment of shut-in royalties after expiration of
the primary term preserved the entire lease made revisiting that issue superfluous. See
also Bennett v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 405 F.2d 1005, 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that
"the so-called 'Pugh' clause does not divide the lease in a case such as this which in-
volves compulsory unitization by orders of the Louisiana Conservation Commissioner").
236 4 WILLIAMS & MEYERS supra note 2 § 669.14 at 51 (quoting Smith, 104 F. Supp. at
198-
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When reading this clause separately from the rest of the lease contract, it
appears that the Pugh clause would affect a division of the lease where
there was either a declared unit or compulsory pooling by the Commis-
sioner of Conservation. However, the Court reasoned that the pooling
clause containing the Pugh clause applied only to declared units; thus,
the Pugh clause was also applicable only to voluntarily pooling.
Similarly, tie United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Low-
man v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 237 held that a Pugh clause applied only to
units voluntarily created by the lessee, not to units established by the
Commissioner of Conservation; thus, the entire lease was maintained by
unit production without the payment of delay rentals or operations on the
leased land not included in the unit. The Pugh clause there was contained
in a type-written addendum to the lease and provided:
Anything to the contryt elsewhere in this lease notwithstanding, it
is understood and agreed that drilling, mining or re-working opera-
tions upon, or production of any mineral from any unit established
by a Lessee pursuant to Paragraph 2238 hereof shall not serve to
maintain thi; lease as to the non-unitized portion, i.e. that portion of
the leased lands no included in any such unit, but only as to the unit-
ized portion, i.e. that portion of the leased lands included in such
unit. If any such unit is established, then this lease may be main-
tained (a) as to the non-unitized portion and (b) separately as to each
unitized portion in any manner elsewhere provided in this lease.239
Though the Pugh clause in Lowman was not included within a pooling
clause, as was the case in Smith, Odom, and Bennett, the specific refer-
ence to the poolirg clausp (Paragraph 2 of the lease) convinced the Court
that the Pugh clause was only triggered by creation of a voluntary unit.24 0
There exists no general policy in Louisiana against application of
Pugh clauses to compulsory units. 24 1 Lessors who so desire could and
often do draft Pugh clauses applicable to both units created by the lessee
and units compe.led by the Commissioner of Conservation.2 42 Under
both Louisiana state and federal jurisprudence, a lessor should be careful
to state when the Pugh clause is applicable 24 3 and should avoid including
467).
748 F.2d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 1984).
238 Paragraph 2 of the lease contained the pooling clause.
3 Lowman, 748 F. 2d at 321.
O4o Patrick H. Martin, Developments in Business Law 1984-1985: Mineral Rights, 46
LA. L. REv. 569, 584 (1986). See also Lowman, 748 F. 2d at 322.
241 Martin, supra note 240 at 584.
242 id
243 The Pugh Claus, in Will-Drill Res., Inc., provides an example of how to draft a
clause that will divide a lease upon either voluntary or compulsory creation of a unit. The
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the Pugh clause in any clause giving the lessee authority to pool the
leased premises or describing the procedure for voluntary pooling.
Units Comprised Entirely of Leased Land
A common Pugh clause provision provides that a lease will be di-
vided with the establishment of a unit that pools or combines a portion of
the lands covered by the lease with other lands. Whether or not a unit for
purposes of such a Pugh clause can be comprised entirely of land held
under one lease is an interesting issue. Louisiana jurisprudence on this
subject is mixed, and the conflict has not been resolved by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. However, the prevailing view is that application of such
a Pugh clause is triggered only where a unit combines leased lands with
lands not covered by the lease, and it is inappropriate to apply a Pugh
clause where a unit is formed entirely of lands included within the lease.
In Will-Drill Resources, Inc. v. Huggs, 244 the Court reversed the trial
court and held that the drilling of a well on a unit comprised entirely of
leased land did not activate the Pugh clause in question; thus, unit drill-
ing maintained the lease in its entirety. There, the Commissioner of Con-
servation established a unit, 100% of which unit was made up of land
covered by the lease. In determining that the Pugh clause was inapplica-
ble, the Second Circuit began its analysis by examining the specific lan-
guage of the contract and applying Civil Code contract interpretation
articles. The Pugh clause in Will-Drill stated that it applied when "a drill-
ing and/or production unit be created and established, pooling and com-
clause there stated:
Any provision in this lease to the contrary notwithstanding, it is expressly agreed
that if, either by an order of the Commissioner of Conservation of Louisiana, or by
any other State or Federal authority having control of such matters, or in the man-
ner hereinabove provided, a drilling and/or production unit be created and estab-
lished, pooling and combining a portion of the lands covered by this lease with
other lands, lease or leases in the vicinity thereof, then drilling operations on or
production of oil, gas, sulphur or other minerals from such unit shall continue this
lease in force and effect during or after the primary term only as to the lands cov-
ered hereby which are included in such unit, irrespective of whether such drilling
operations be conducted on, or production be secured from lands covered hereby,
or from other lands embraced within such unit, it being expressly agreed that drill-
ing operations on, or production from any drilling or production unit, however cre-
ated or established, shall not maintain this lease in force or effect during or after the
primary term as to any of the land covered hereby which are not included in such
unit. This lease, during any period in which it is being so maintained as to a part of
the land covered hereby may be maintained as to the remainder of said lands in any
manner elsewhere provided for herein; provided that if it be maintained by rental
payment, the rentals may be reduced in proportion to the number of acres in such
unit or units as to which this lease is being maintained by drilling operation or pro-
duction.
Will-Drill Res., Inc., 738 So. 2d at 1197.
244 738 So. 2d at 1198-1199.
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bining a portion of the lands covered by this lease with other lands, lease
or leases in the vicinity thereof. . ." and that "drilling operations on, or
production from any drilling or production unit, however created or es-
tablished, shall not maintain this lease in force or effect during or after
the primary term as to any of the lands covered hereby which are not in-
cluded in such unit." 24 5 The court found that the latter phrase clarified the
former phrase instead of setting forth an independent application of the
Pugh clause.246 It determined that the former phrase required a unitiza-
tion of the leased land with unleased lands (or land held under a different
lease).
The Will-Drill court next considered its contractual interpretation in
light of the purposes of Pugh clauses, unitization, and pooling. The court
determined that a unit for purposes of a Pugh clause should be comprised
of lands covered by the lease and lands outside of the lease because the
function of a unit is to merge or integrate separate rights to produce. 247 it
found further that the purpose of the Pugh clause is to prevent dilution,
caused by unitization, of the landowner-lessor's royalty interests. 248
245 Id. at 1199. (emphasis added).
246 Id. at 1199-120D.
247 Id. at 1200. (Ci'ing Patrick H. Martin, Review ofRecent Developments: 1991-1992:
Mineral Rights, 53 LA. L. REv. 891, 910 (1993)).
248 Id. at 1200. Set also SMK Energy Corp. v. Westchester Gas Co., 705 S.W.2d 174
(Tex. Ct. App 1985). SMK dealt with an issue somewhat similar to the question of
whether a unit for purposes of a Pugh clause can be comprised entirely of the leased
premises. There, the court found that a clause providing for extension of the lease beyond
the primary term only as to leased acreage which is pooled or unitized was not a Pugh
clause. Id. at 176. The clause in SMK stated:
Notwithstanding any provisions in this lease to the contrary, it is understood and
agreed that the 's lease shall not (repeat not) extend beyond the primary term as to
any part of the icreage described therein, excepting that part of the acreage which
is then (at the end of the primary term) pooled or unitized for drilling, reworking
operations, or p oduction of oil and/or gas from such a unit or units then (at the end
of the primary erm) formed by LESSEE; and, as to that party of the acreage in-
cluded within the boundaries of a unit or units so formed, such a lease shall be per-
petuated and continued only so long after the expiration of the primary term as pro-
duction, drilling or reworking operation are continuously conducted thereon with-
out interruption or cessation of more than ninety (90) days.
Id. There, the 1:ssee began drilling a well on a designated 40 acre tract wholly
within the leased trac: just before expiration of the primary term. Id. The lessee argued
that the clause in question was a Pugh clause which was not activated because the leased
land was not pooled or unitized with any other lands. Id The lessor argued the provision
was not a Pugh clause, but was provision designed to prevent the holding of the entire
lease by only one producing well. Id. The court rule in favor of the lessor, holding that
the clause was not a Pugh clause because it was not conditioned upon the exercise of
pooling rights. Id. The leased premises outside of the 40 acre tract were tendered back to
the lessor.
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Where leased land has not been combined with other lands to create a
unit, this purpose cannot be fulfilled.249
In an earlier case, Fremaux v. Buie,250 the Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeal addressed comparable circumstances and reached a
similar conclusion. The court there held that an assignment of royalties
using a description of forty acres around a producing well did not create
a unit.25 1 The Pugh clause in Fremaux applied where "a portion or por-
tions of the land herein leased is pooled or unitized with other land so as
to form a pooled unit or units." 2 52 Like Will-Drill, the alleged forty acre
unit was comprised only of leased land. The court found that a "unit" of
acreage was formed for intra-lease division of mineral production for
accounting purposes, but such "unit" did not constitute a pooled unit
within the parameters of the Pugh clause. 253 The court reasoned that the
so-called "unit" did not affect the lessor's interests; thus, the purpose of
the Pugh clause in avoiding undesirable effects of unitization would not
be advanced by application of the Pugh clause.254
However, an opinion rendered by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal is in conflict with the holdings in Will-Drill and Fre-
maux. In Banner v. GEO Consultants International, Inc.,255 the Fourth
Circuit determined that the creation of a "unit" comprised entirely of one
party's land triggered the application of the Pugh clause in the lease. In
Banner, leases covering 1220 acres were granted to one party and then
assigned to another. The assignee drilled a producing well on the leased
premises. After expiration of the primary term, the assignee reassigned
the leased premises, excluding a 160 acre square around the producing
well, to the original lessee. The Court found that the 160 acre tract was a
unit for purposes of the Pugh clause.256 In determining what constituted a
Pugh clause unit, the court considered the Louisiana Mineral Code defi-
nition of "unit" in Article 213257 and gave great weight to the comment to
249 Will-Drill Res., Inc., 738 So. 2d at 1200.
250 212 So. 2d at 150-151.
251 Id. at 151.
22 Id. at 149.
253 Id. at 151.
254 Id.
255 593 So. 2d 934 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
256 The Pugh clause stated, "Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, it is provided
that if any portion of the lands held hereunder should be unitized in any manner with
other lands, then unit drilling or reworking operations on or unit production from any unit
shall only maintain this lease as to the land included in such unit." Banner, 539 So. 2d at
935.
257 La. Min. Code art. 216 (6)(La. Rev. Stat. § 31:213(6) (2007)) provides:
"Unit" means an area of land, deposit or deposits of minerals, stratum or strata, or
pool or pools, or a part or parts thereof, as to which parties with interests therein are
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Article 213, which states that "the definition includes conventional units
of all kinds, whether established by declaration under a pooling power,
by a contract executed by all parties affected or otherwise." The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that reference to "conventional units of all kinds" was
sufficiently broad to encompass the 160 acre tract reserved to the as-
-258signee.
The decision in Banner has been questioned in subsequent. Louisi-
ana jurisprudence and by commentators and legal scholars. The court in
Will-Drill attempted to explain its divergent conclusion by distinguishing
the language of the Pugh clause in Banner.259 The court pointed out that
the Pugh clause in Will-Drill used the terms "pooling and combining" of
leased land, whereas the clause in Banner did not include those terms. 26 0
Because of this Jifference, the court stated that Banner was not control-
ling.26 Perhaps recognizing the weakness of this argument, the court
added that "to the extent Banner is inconsistent with our decision, we
decline to follow it."2 6 2 Further, the Will-Drill court noted Professor Mar-
tin's critique of danner in which he stated:
The Banner court apparently completely misunderstood the nature
of a unit, fEiling as it did to understand that a unit merges or inte-
grates separate rights to produce. . . Under the approach adopted by
the court, any sublease or assignment of a portion of a lease may be
treated as a unit for Pugh Clause purposes. This is clearly erroneous.
This criticism seems a fair assessment of the Banner opinion. Ban-
ner appears to be based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature
of a unit. A standard Pugh clause provides that a lease will be divided
with the establishment of a unit that pools or combines a portion of the
leased lands wit other lands. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court
has not resolved the issue, it seems most likely that under current juris-
prudence a Louisiana court should only apply such a Pugh clause to di-
vide a lease whe-e a unit was made up of the leased premises combined
with a tract not covered by the same lease, despite the holding in Banner.
Moreover, given the nature of a unit 26 3 and the purpose of a Pugh clause
bound to share minerals produced on a specific basis and as to which those having
the right to conduct drilling or mining operations therein are bound to share in-
vestment and operating cost on a specified basis. A unit may be formed by conven-
tion or by order of an agency of the state or federal government empowered to do
so. A unit formed by order of a governmental agency is termed a "compulsory
unit."
258 Banner, 593 Sc. 2d at 935.
259 Will-Drill Res., Inc.,738 So. 2d at 1201.
260 id.
261 Id.
262 d
263 Martin, supra note 247 at 910-911.
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as set out by case law,264 a court could easily find that a Pugh clause
which merely states that "drilling operations on or production from a
pooled unit or units shall maintain the lease in force only as to lands in-
cluded within such unit or units"265 is not activated by creation of a unit
comprised only of leased lands.
Does the Pugh Clause Give Rise to a Horizontal Division of the
Lease?
The vast majority of Pugh clauses in Louisiana affect a vertical divi-
sion of leased land; that is, most Pugh clauses are invoked to divide the
surface of the leased premises. However, in some instances a Pugh
clause may divide the leased premises horizontally at a specific depth
below the surface. In such cases, the clause is called a "horizontal Pugh
clause" or a "bottomhole severance clause." Where a Pugh clause is
found to divide property horizontally, a few interesting issues arise, and
some oil and gas-producing states occasionally differ in their resolution
of these issues. These issues include (1) whether a standard Pugh clause
lacking language specifically suggesting horizontal division can be ap-
plied to horizontally sever the leased land, and (2) if a lease is found to
contain a horizontal Pugh clause, how is the horizontal boundary at
which the leased premises will be divided determined, and is such
boundary at a consistent, fixed depth or at variable depths.
Can a Standard Pugh Clause Be Given Horizontal Application?
One interesting issue that Louisiana courts have not yet considered
is whether a standard Pugh clause 26 6 can be used only to divide property
vertically, or whether it also may be applied to horizontally divide leased
premises. A Texas court in Friedrich v. Amoco Production Company has
addressed the question.267 The court in Friedrich held that the Pugh
clause in question could not be applied to divide the leased premises
horizontally in the absence of specific reference in the lease to a depth
limit or horizontal severance. 268 There, two leases totaling 320 surface
264 Fremaux, 212 So. 2d at 151; Will-Drill Resources, Inc.,738 So. 2d at 1200.
265 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 at 849.
266 For an example of a standard Pugh Clause, see Banner, 539 So. 2d at 935.
267 698 S.W.2d 748, 754 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985).
268 Id. The pooling clause in the Friedrich lease provided:
Lessee is granted the right and power to pool all or any part of the leased premises
with any other lands, as to any stratum or strata and as to any mineral or minerals,
and as to all or any interests therein, and by whomsoever owned, for development
and operation of the same as a unit or units ...
Id. at 750. The Pugh clause stated:
In the event a portion or portions of the land herein leased is pooled or unitized
with other land so as to form a pooled unit or units, operations on, completion of a
well upon, or production from such unit or units will not maintain this lease in
force as to the land not included in such unit or units. The lease may be maintained
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acres were assigned only as to depths from the surface to 1298 feet. All
320 acres of the leases were then pooled, and assignee paid the full
amount of shut-in royalties designated by the lease. Production was not
obtained from any part of the leased premises, and no delay rentals were
paid for depths below 1298 feet. Upon expiration of the primary term,
the lessors brought an action to terminate the lease as to the depths below
1298 feet, arguing that the Pugh clauses in the leases affected a vertical
and horizontal division of the leased property. The lessor asserted that
the word "land' as used in the lease should be considered as three-
dimensional. The court disagreed with the lessor and, instead, it followed
a prior Oklahona Supreme Court decision.2 69 The court reasoned that
where vertical division was the customary application of a Pugh clause,
and where the terms used in the Pugh clause - "land" and "number of
acres covered hereby and included in such unit or units" - suggested only
a customary application of the Pugh clause, the Pugh clause could only
be applied to affect a vertical division of the lease.2 0 Thus, the payment
of shut-in royalties preserved the entirety of the lease.
Though the Texas court in Friedrich seemed reluctant to invoke a
Pugh clause to horizontally divide leased property absent specific con-
in force as to ainy land covered hereby and not included in such unit or units in any
manner provided for herein; provided that if it be by rental payments, rentals shall
be reduced in proportion to the number of acres covered hereby and included in
such unit or units. If at or after the end of the primary term, this lease is being
maintained as .o a part of the lands by operations on, completion of a well upon, or
production from a pooled unit or units embracing lands covered hereby and other
land, and if at such time there be land covered hereby which is not situated in such
unit or units ar:d as to which the lease is not being maintained by operations, com-
pletion of a well, or production, Lessee shall have the right to maintain the lease as
to such land by rental payments exactly as if it were during the primary term, pro-
vided that this lease may not be so maintained in force by rental payments more
than three (3) years beyond the end of the primary term. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 750.
269 Rist v. Westhona Oil Company, 385 P. 2d 791, 795 (Ok. 1963). The Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Riust addressed the question of whether a Pugh clause terminated a lease
as to horizons below sea level at expiration of the primary term of the lease. Id. The court
held that parties only contemplated a vertical severance of the lease through application
of the Pugh clause. I The court reasoned as follows:
[t]here is nowhere contained any language that purports to recognize or show inten-
tion that these terms are to apply or even recognize other than the customary appli-
cation of vertical severance. Certainly the parties could have made reference to par-
tial consolidation or separate horizontal structures by appropriate terms. But they
say nothing as to depths, levels, or strata. The words "Tract or tracts," "Premises,"
"lands," and "leasehold estates" do not import to our minds other than their com-
mon meaning.
Id. at 795. The holding in Rist, as it applies in Oklahoma, is likely moot now be-
cause Oklahoma has since created a statutory Pugh clause. But see La. Min. Code art. 114
(La. Rev. Stat. § 31:1: 4 (2007)).
no Rist, 385 P. 2d at 794.
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tractual language demonstrating intent to horizontally sever the premises,
the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was not so reluctant
when applying Kansas law. In Rogers v. Westhoma Oil Co., the district
court found that:
the Pugh clauses were written in 'surface sounding terms' and do not
'specifically or clearly designate underground horizons' and con-
cluded that the provisions of the Pugh clauses terminating the leases
at the end of the primary terms as to ununitized nonproducing por-
tions apply only to 'partial unitization of less than all of the surface
acreage covered by the leases.' 271
The Rogers court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the
Pugh clauses in the leases applied to both a vertical and a horizontal sev-
erance of the leasehold estate.272 There, one company held a lease cover-
ing all lands above sea level, and another company held a lease covering
lands below sea level. The above-sea-level leases were consolidated, and
production in paying quantities was obtained only from those units. The
Rogers court found that the leases as to the below-sea-level horizons
terminated because of lack of production and unitization.273 This finding,
according to the Tenth Circuit, was in accord with the function of a Pugh
clause to protect lessors from continuation of the lease over non-unitized
and unused portions of the leased premises.274 The court reasoned that
there was "[n]othing in the leases which confines the application of the
Pugh clauses to surface areas and vertical divisions." 275 It also stated that
"[i]t is common knowledge that leases are divided both vertically and
horizontally and that unitization is ordinarily on the basis of a common
source of supply." 276 Thus, the court concluded that the parties intended
to prohibit nonuse of the leased premises, either through vertical or hori-
zontal severance.277
The Texas court in Friedrich and the Tenth Circuit in Rogers
seemed to use opposite assumptions when determining whether a basic
Pugh clause should apply horizontally as well as vertically. The Texas
court in Friedrich, following a previous Oklahoma Supreme Court deci-
271 291 F.2d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1961).
272 Id. at 733-734. The Pugh clause provided that if the leased premises is consoli-
dated, the lease will be continued "as to the premises covered hereby and included in any
such consolidation of estates" by a producing gas well located on a consolidated unit or
by oil production from a well on leased land, and that the lease will terminate after the
primary term as to any "tract or tracts not included in a consolidation held in force by
production." Id. at 730.
273 Id. at 733-734.
274 id.
275 Id. at 731.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 732.
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sion, assumed ihat a Pugh clause only applied to divide leased property
vertically unless the clause contained specific language implying the
possibility of a horizontal severance. 278 The Tenth Circuit applying Kan-
sas law, on the other hand, assumed that a Pugh clause could divide
property vertically and horizontally, absent specific language in the
279clause limiting -ts application to a vertical severance.
Whether a Louisiana court faced with this issue would follow one of
these two approaches or would create its own approach is undetermined
as no Louisiana court has yet had an opportunity to address this issue.
What is the Appropriate Horizontal Boundary after a Release
Pursuant to a Pugh Clause?
Finding the existence of a horizontal Pugh clause often leads to an-
other complicated task: determining the location of the horizontal bound-
ary at which severance will occur. No Louisiana state court has ad-
dressed applicaiion of a horizontal Pugh clause, but the Fifth Circuit in
Sandefer Oil Gas, Inc. v. Duhon 28 0 had the opportunity to consider the
issue and held that the Pugh clause divided the leased premises 100 feet
below the base of the sand from which the well was producing, rather
than the depth to which the well was drilled. The Pugh clause in Sandefer
provided:
After expiration of the primary term, this lease will terminate auto-
matically as to all horizons situated 100 feet below the deepest
depth drillcd (a) from which a well located on the land or acreage
pooled therewith is producing in paying quantities, or (b) in which
there is completed on the land or acreage pooled therewith a shut-in
gas well which cannot be produced because of lack of market, mar-
keting facilities, or because of governmental restrictions, whichever
is the greater depth.281
The lessees in Sandefer drilled a well to a total depth of 17,609 feet
on land pooled with a portion of the lease tract, but the well only pro-
duced from perforations between 17,090 and 17,200 feet. And, the well
was producing from a formation, the Middle Miogypsionoides Sand (the
"Middle Miogyp"), located at a depth between 17,100 and 17,250 feet.
Another formation was located directly below the Middle Miogyp, and
though the well was drilled into the lower formation, the formations were
separated by 50 feet of shale, so production was attributable only to the
Middle Miogyp After expiration of the primary term, the lessee released
to the lessor all horizons below 17,700 feet. The issue in Sandefer was,
under the horizontal Pugh clause, what was the proper horizontal lease
278 Friedrich, 698 S.W.2d at 754.
279 Rogers, 291 F.2d at 731.
280 961 F. 2d 120,, 1209 (5th Cir. 1992).
281 Id. at 1208.
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boundary below which the leased premises was to be tendered back to
the lessor. The Fifth Circuit began by interpreting the actual language of
the horizontal Pugh clause. It determined that the word "depth" was
modified by "deepest," "drilled," and "from which a well ... is producing
in paying quantities."282 Reasoning that the base of the sand from which
the well was actually producing in the Middle Miogyp was the only
depth that met the three criteria, the court concluded that the lease would
be severed 100 feet below the bottom of the Middle Miogyp (at 17,350
feet).283 The Fifth Circuit found that this interpretation was in accordance
with the intent of the parties and with the purpose of a Pugh clause, to
assure that lessees diligently explore and develop the leased premises.284
The Fifth Circuit in Sandefer made another important decision re-
garding the location of the boundary line at which the lease would be
severed under the horizontal Pugh clause there at issue. The Court held
that boundary was not an absolute vertical depth, 17,350 feet, throughout
the entire leased premises.2 85 Instead, the boundary was 100 feet below
the base of the formation from which the well was producing, at what-
ever depth the formation was found throughout the leased tract.286 In
other words, the boundary was tied to the actual stratigraphy. The Fifth
circuit reasoned that the parties intended the word "horizon" to mean "a
body of material or a stratum found below the earth's surface, generally
considered to be a bed of sand or other material which contains oil, gas,
and other minerals..."and that this meaning was consistent with use of
the term in the oil and gas industry. 287
A Texas court in EOG Resources, Inc. v. Wagner & Brown, LTD.
recently considered issues similar to those addressed by the Fifth Circuit
in Sandefer. In EOG, the court held that language similar to that consid-
ered in Sandefer referred to a fixed vertical depth and not to a subsurface
geologic formation. 288 Though the clause in EOG was part of a farmout
agreement not a Pugh clause, the court's decision is still instructive as to
282 Id. at 1210.
283 Id. at l211.
284 Id. at 1210-1211. But see Martin, supra note 247 at 911 (questioning the rationale
of Sandefer by stating "[t]he appeals court read the clause such that 'producing in paying
quantities' modified 'depth' and not 'well.' The court's strained interpretation of syntax
was bolstered, in its view, by the purpose of a Pugh clause to overcome the rule of Hunter
v. Shell Oil and to insure diligent development.").
2 Sandefer, 961 F. 2d at 1211.
286 id
287 Id. The court used the definition of "horizon" given by WILLIAMS & MEYERS
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS. See 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 at 566 (defin-
ing horizon as "a zone of a particular formation ... of sufficient porosity and permeability
to form a petroleum reservoir").
288 202 S.W.3d 338, (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
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how a court may interpret a phrase intended to create a horizontal divi-
sion of leased property. The provision in question stated "[t]he Assign-
ment provided for above shall be limited in depth to 100 feet below the
deepest producing interval as obtained in the test well..."'" The court
found that the boundary was fixed at a dqpth of 9,829, which was 100
feet below the base of the deepest producing formation in the test well. 2 90
As in Sandefer, the farmout agreement in EOG established a horizontal
subsurface boundary separating the mineral rights belonging to two dif-
ferent parties. The assignee argued that the words "deepest producing
interval" referred to the formation from which production was obtained,
at whatever depth or interval the formation was found. 29' The Texas
court was not, however, persuaded by this argument. It reasoned that the
agreement con:ained no language which would indicate that the parties
intended to convey interests according to a variable depth.292 The court
noted that the terms "horizon," "field," "reservoir," and "stratigraphic
layer" demonstrate intent to encompass the depth of an entire formation,
but that none o F these terms were used in the farmout agreement in ques-
293tion.
The reasonfing in EOG suggests that the Texas state court likely
would have reached the same conclusion as the Fifth Circuit in Sandefer
had the farmou: agreement contained the word "horizon" as did the Pugh
clause in Sandefer. Under these two cases, if a party wishes to divide the
leased premises under a Pugh clause along a horizontal boundary based
on the depth of a formation rather than a 'fixed depth, such party should
take care to carefully craft language that reflects its intent. Both courts
relied heavily on the specific text of the clauses in question.
V. Selected Issues under the Mother Hubbard Clause
A "Mother-Hubbard" or "cover-all" clause is often found in oil and
gas leases or in mineral deeds relating to oil and gas lands. This type of
clause is also known as a "catchall," "all-inclusive," or "all-embracing"
clause.294 The paLrpose of the Mother Hubbard clause is to:
prevent thc leaving of small unleased pieces or strips of land which
may exist without the knowledge of one or both of the parties by
29 Id. at 341.
290 However, a ;econd well in which the same sand was encountered produced at
depths between 10,230 feet and 10,266 feet because of geological faulting and a struc-
tural dip in the formation. Id. at 341.
291 Id. This was the interpretation that the Fifth Circuit gave to the horizontal Pugh
clause in Sandefer. S'andefer, 961 F. 2d at 1211.
292 EOG Res., Inc., 202 S.W.3d at 345.
293 id.
294 Martin J. McMahon, Construction and Application of "Mother Hubbard" or
"Cover-All" Clause in Gas and Oil Lease or Deed, 80 A.L.R. 4th 205 § 1[a] (2007).
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reason of incorrect surveying, careless location of fences, or other
mistake. The clause[] evidence[s] the intention of the grantor to in-
clude within the lease not only the land described by metes and
bounds, but also any adjoining land mistakenly excluded.295
Significantly, "[c]over-all clauses are not highly regarded by the courts
generally." 296
Nevertheless, it is wise to include a Mother Hubbard or cover-all
clause in an oil and gas lease or mineral deed of oil and gas lands to
avoid future expense to the lessee. Indeed, failure to include a specific
description of a narrow strip of land in a lease or deed may cause extra
expense to the lessee due to drainage problems, conservation principles
and could result in the drilling of an unnecessary well on a strip of land
leased to another.297 It has been suggested that an unwritten law in the oil
and gas industry dictates that tracts accidentally caught in cover-all
clauses should be released and that lessees have generally been willing to
waive the provision as to adjacent surveys not within the specific de-
scription. 29 8 However, custom is not always followed, and the lessor
should take measures to ensure that property not intended to be leased is
excluded from a cover-all provision. 9
Typically, a Mother Hubbard or coverall clause is placed after a
specific description of the land intended to be conveyed or affected by
295 Gary A. Hughes, John Kimpflen & Anne E. Melley, Cover-All or "Mother Hub-
bard" Clause, 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gas and Oil § 94 (2006) (citing Peacock v. Schroeder, 846
S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)).
296 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 221.3.
297 BROWN, supra note 232 § 4.02; See also I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 §
221:
Variances between survey lines and the lines of the tract actually owned by the
landowner sometime result in this way: the landowner in fencing his tract, or in
some other way indicating its boundaries, will put the fence or other monument at a
convenient place, which place varies from the description in the instrument under
which he claims ownership. For example, there may be a row of trees three hundred
feet east of the actual east boundary line, which trees make convenient substitute
for fence posts. Thereafter the landowner matures title to the strip by adverse pos-
session. Still later the landowner executes an oil and gas lease which carries for-
ward the description in the deed, and thus usually fails to pick up the strip which
landowner has acquired title by adverse possession. It may be possible for a de-
scription to include the strip under the doctrine of agreed boundary ... or the doc-
trine of boundary by acquiescence ...; however, it is never safe to assume that ei-
ther doctrine applies where the problem before the attorney in preparation of in-
struments, or advising as to the construction thereof, short of the law-suit stage.
1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 221 at 300.12(3).
298 Barney T. Young, Deeds - Mines and Minerals - Oil and Gas - Mother Hubbard
Clause in Ambiguous Mineral Deed. - Smith v. Allison, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. Rep. 186 (1956);
modied on rehearing, 26 Tex.Sup.Ct.Rep. 436 (1957), 35 TEx. L. REv. 595, 597 (1957).
299 Id.
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the oil and gas lease or mineral deed.oo Moreover, a typical Mother
Hubbard clause attempts to cover or convey adjacent land 01 or land that
is included in te same survey, section or county.302 A common Mother
Hubbard or cover-all clause reads as follows:
It being thc intention, however, of lessor, to include within the terms
of this lea. e not only the above-described land, but also any and all
other land owned or claimed by lessor in said survey or surveys in
which the above-described land is situated, or in adjoining surveys
and adjoining the above-described land.303
Is the Mother Hubbard Clause Valid?
The Louis:.ana Supreme Court has yet to address the validity and
affect of a Mother Hubbard or cover-all clause; however, there is Louisi-
ana jurisprudence interpreting such clauses.3 0 The most recent case in
Louisiana involving the validity of a Mother Hubbard or cover-all clause
is Bergeron v. A moco Production Co., a United States Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals cast. applying Louisiana law.30s In Bergeron, the oil and gas
lease in question contained the following coverall clause in pertinent
part: "All lands owned by the Lessor in the above-mentioned Section or
Sections or Surveys, ... are included herein, whether properly or specifi-
cally described :r not ... "306 The Fifth Circuit, citing the Louisiana cases
of Williams and Melancon, held that a coverall clause is valid under Lou-
isiana law.07 Thus, the lessor's interests in a 40 acre strip of land were
conveyed under the clause.308
3 3 WILLIAMS A' MEYERS, supra note 2 § 665.5.
301 See United Gas Public Services Co. v. Mitchell, 177 So. 697 (La. 1937); Whitehead
v. Johnston, 467 So. 2d 240 (Ala. 1985); Cummings v. Midstates Oil Corp., 9 So. 2d 648
(Miss. 1942); Smith v. Allison, 310 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. 1956).
302 See Bergeron v. Amoco Production Co., 789 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1986); Luthi v.
Evans, 567 P.2d 1064 (Kan. 1978); Gulf Production Co. v. Spear, 84 S.W.2d 452 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1935).
303 Brown, supra note 232 § 4.02 at 4-8. See also Brown, supra note 232 § 4.03 at 4-
11 (containing six variations of the Mother Hubbard or cover-all clause in deed and oil
and gas leases).
3 All of the .aiesdealing with Mother Hubbard or cover-all clauses in Louisiana
arise from an oil and gas lease. Indeed, Louisiana courts have not yet addressed a Mother
Hubbard clause in a deed of oil and gas lands. Nevertheless, other courts have uniformly
applied the law to Mother Hubbard clauses found in both leases and deeds. See e.g.
Smith, 301 S.W.2d at 608; Texas Osage Co-Operative Royalty Pool, Inc. v. Thomas, 270
S.W2d 450 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954).
30s 789 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1986). See also Martin, supra note 240 at 574-75 (discuss-
ing the facts of Bergeron and the reasoning of the court); Patrick H. Martin, Develop-
ments in the Law, 1986-87 A Faculty Symposium: Mineral Rights, 48 LA. L. REv. 387,
392 (1987) (same).
' 789 F.2d at 345.
307 Id. at 346.
308 id
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The case most heavily relied on by the Fifth Circuit and the district
court in Bergeron is Melancon v. Melancon, a case decided by the Lou-
isiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in 1967.309 In Melancon, the court
implicitly approved of the use of a Mother Hubbard clause in an oil and
gas lease: "This [coverall] clause ... is inserted for the protection of the
lessee should the lessor own additional property adjacent to the property
described in the lease ... It was inserted in the lease to protect the les-
see." 3 0 The Fifth Circuit, in Bergeron, further relied on Williams v.
Bowie Lumber Co., a Louisiana Supreme Court case, to support its find-
ing that Louisiana courts have approved the coverall clause "concept."31'
The court made this finding because Louisiana courts have consistently
held that, as between the parties, an omnibus designation is as effective
to transfer land as a precise and certain description. 12
Another notable Louisiana case interpreting a similar clause in an
oil and gas lease is Dees v. Hunt Oil Co., decided in 1954."' In Dees, the
Western District of Louisiana interpreted the following clause: "The
lease covers not only such interest in leased premises as the party consti-
tuting Lessor presently owns therein but also such additional interests as
he may acquire in the future ... " Although not a Mother Hubbard or
cover-all clause, the above-cited clause has the same effect as to after
acquired titles. The Court found that the clause covered the lessor's later-
acquired mineral rights to approximately 260 acres of land.1 s
Although Mother Hubbard clauses are utilized in most oil-
producing states, such clauses are invariably found in oil and gas leases
in Texas.? Thus, Texas law provides the most fertile grounds for analy-
sis of the clause. The Texas Commission of Appeals, in 1935, decided
three cases that are widely cited and accepted as prescedent: Sun Oil Co.
v. Burns,'3 7 Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett,318 and Gulf Production Co. v.
Spear.319 Significant issues decided in these cases are discussed below in
3 Id; 602 F.Supp. 551, 554-5 (La. M.D. 1984).
310 Melancon v. Melancon, 199 So. 2d 573, 576 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
3" Bergeron, 789 F.2d at 346.
312 Id. An entirely separate issue is whether the clause is effective as to third parties to
the agreement. This issue is covered in Section IV C, infra.
3 123 F.Supp. 58 (W.D. La. 1954).
314 Id. at 59.
sis Id. at 61-62.
316 See generally, Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral
Deeds and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1
(1993).
3 84 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935).
318 Id.
319 id
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more detail. Moreover, the Alabama Supreme Court has also addressed
the validity of a Mother Hubbard clause and held that the cover-all clause
in the standard Producers' 88 oil, gas and mineral lease is valid and en-
forceable.320
Several issues have surfaced nationally regarding the Mother Hub-
bard or cover-all clause and some but not all have been addressed in
Louisiana. These issues include the following: (1) whether the size of the
omitted strip matters, (2) the effect of the clause as to third persons, (3)
the effect of an assignment of a lease or deed containing a coverall
clause, and (4) :he effect when a lease contains both a Mother Hubbard
clause and a specific reservation.321
Does the Size of the Omitted Strip Matter?
An often discussed issue among oil-producing states is whether or
not the size of the strip omitted from the specific land description affects
the enforceability or application of the Mother Hubbard or cover-all
clause.322 The Texas Supreme Court addressed this issue in 1957 in the
case of Smith v. Allison.323 In Allison, the court held that a Mother Hub-
bard or cover-al. clause is intended only to prevent the omission of small
strips of land anl is not intended to convey large areas.324 In making this
holding, the court explained that there is a public policy in Texas that
discourages separate ownership of small tracts of land.325 The court fur-
ther explained:
320 Whitehead v. Johnson, 467 So. 2d 240 (Ala. 1985). The majority of-the court in
Whitehead found that the Mother Hubbard provision in the lease did not render the lease
ambiguous. Therefore, parol evidence was not admissible to determine the true intent of
the parties.
321 Other issues rot discussed in this paper but mentioned elsewhere include the fol-
lowing: (1) whether the premises falling within the general description of the cover-all
clause are gramma-ically part of the object of the verb used as words of grant; I
WILLIAMS & MEYER S, supra note 2 § 221.1; (2) whether express provision is made con-
cerning the effects (if inclusion of premises not particularly described in the lease upon
the rental payments required by the lease; Dees v. Hunt, 123 F.Supp. 58 (W.D. La. 1954);
1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 221.1; and (3) the effect of excision of a cover-all
clause; I WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 221.6.
322 See Hughes, supra note 295 § 94; Edward K. Esping, 55 TEX. JUR. 3D OIL AND GAS
§ 55 (2007).
323 301 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. 1957). See also Young, supra note 298 at 595; 1 WILLIAMS
& MEYERS, supra note 2 § 221.3.
324 301 S.W.2d 6C8.
3 Id. In Smith v. Allison, the trial court held that the instrument was ambiguous and
therefore it was appropriate to look to parol evidence to determine the intent of the par-
ties. The original opinion of the Texas Supreme Court also found the lease ambiguous.
Nevertheless, on ref earing, the court did not describe the deed as ambiguous and held
that the parties did r.ot intend to convey anything but a small strip of land based on the
clear language of the lease.
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To give the ultimate effect contended by the respondents would re-
sult in the conveyance of one-half the minerals under the 320 acres
particularly described and additionally the conveyance by the gen-
eral catch-all clause of one-half of the minerals under 1,400 acres.
This result does not comport with ordinary custom or practice, and
we think the parties here could have had no such intention.326
The Texas Supreme Court later reaffirmed this holding in Jones v. Colle:
"Our holding in Smith precludes [the defendant] from using the Mother
Hubbard clause to secure title to the minerals in the 49.34 acre adjoining
tract, the existence of which was known to both parties at the time the
lease was executed." 327
In Alabama, Mother Hubbard clauses have also been found to apply
exclusively to small tracts of land. Indeed, the Alabama Supreme Court
has stated: "the [Mother Hubbard] clause was intended to apply only to
small tracts of land adjacent to specifically described land, but inadver-
tently omitted, or small tracts of land that were said to constitute a part of
the described tracts." 328
Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court has explained:
It is also commonly known that one of the purposes of the cover-all
clause is to gather into the description small strips of areas forming
a part of the tract as a whole, not a part of the lands particularly de-
scribed, but adjacent thereto, the reason for their not being particu-
larly described being that a particular description of them is. not
available but, in most cases, dependent upon a survey.329 (emphasis
added)
Louisiana has yet to directly address this issue; nevertheless, the
district court in Bergeron rejected the Texas decisions disfavoring the
application of the Mother Hubbard clause to large tracts of land.330 In-
deed, in discussing Texas' public policy against separate ownership of
small strips of land, the district court stated that "[tihis Court is aware of
no similar public policy in the State of Louisiana." 3 Accordingly, Lou-
isiana courts may not disfavor the transfer of large areas of land under a
326 Smith, 301 S.W.2d at 617-18.
327 727 S.W.2d 232, 263 (Tex. 1987). See also J Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer, 172
S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2005); Eric T. Laity, Oil, Gas and Mineral Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 425
(1988); Harry L. Reed, Texas Oil and Gas Law in a World of Tort Reform, 48 S. TEX. L.
REv. 259 (2006); Richard F. Brown, Oil Gas and Mineral Law, 56 SMU L. REv. 1825
(2003).
328 Whitehead v. Johnson, 467 So. 2d at 242.
329 Continental Oil Co. v. Walker, 117 So. 2d 333, 338 (Miss. 1960).
330 602 F.Supp. 551, 554 (La. M.D. 1984).
331 Id.
-214-
45
Hebert: A Review of Selected Lease Clauses
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2007
Mother Hubbard or coverall clause.332 Indeed, Louisiana courts have ap-
proved applicatiDn of the Mother Hubbard and similar clauses to a tract
of 40 acres appended to specifically described tracts of 250 acres333 and a
tract of 262.5 acres appended to a specifically described tract of 187.5
acres.334 One leading authority is in accord -with this logic and suggests
that it is appropriate to allow the coverage of large strips of land under a
cover-all clause if this is the intent of the parties.
Additionally, the law is unclear as to what constitutes a "small" strip
of land. It has been posited that "the question does not turn on the abso-
lute acreage of the strip but on the relative acreage of the strip and the
specifically described premises. Thus, a 5-acre tract would presumably
not be viewed as "small" if the specific description was of a 1-acre par-
cel; however the same 5-acre tract would presumably be viewed as
"small" if the specific description was of a quarter section. s
Does the Mother Hubbard Clause Affect Third Persons?
Another issue that has surfaced concerning Mother Hubbard or cov-
erall clauses is whether or not such a clause is sufficient to put third par-
ties on notice that land has been previously conveyed.3 Not surpris-
ingly, due to the well-established Public Records Doctrine in Louisiana,
33 the Louisiana Supreme Court has already decided this issue.
In United Gas Public Service Co. v. Mitchell, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court held that a "vague and indefinite description in a deed, not
descriptive of any particular tract of land, is not sufficient to convey title
to any particular tract of land, especially as to third parties."339 Thus, the
court made it cle ir that, although a Mother Hubbard clause may be effec-
tive between a grantor and grantee, it is not sufficient to put a third party
332 See e.g. Id. at ';52 and Dees, 123 F.Supp. 58. But see Blanchard v. Pan-Ok Produc-
lion Co., Inc. 755 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2000)(suggesting that a cover-all provi-
sions was not intended to include an adjacent 431 acre tract).
3" Bergeron, 789 F.2d at 346.
33 Dees, 123 F.Supp. 58.
3 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 §221.3.
336 Id
11 Id. at § 221.8.
338 See Gullatt v. Newell Industries, Inc., 688 So. 2d 1191, 1195 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1996)("The primary purpose of the public records doctrine is the protection of third per-
sons against unrecorded interests."). The public records doctrine is a negative doctrine: a
person may rely on the absence of a recorded instrument in a parish's conveyance re-
cords. Id.
33 177 So. 697, 6 58 (La. 1937)(emphasis added). The lease in Mitchell contained the
following Mother Hubbard clause that read in pertinent part: "... but this lease shall cover
and include all land 3wned or claimed by lessors contiguous to or forming a part of the
land described or ref :rred to above, whether the same be more or less than the estimated
acreage." Id.
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on notice that land has been previously conveyed.340 Indeed, the court in
Mitchell stated further that a grantor or grantee has a "right of action to
compel specific performance [as between the parties] before the rights of
third parties have intervened."341 This principle has been affirmed by
other Louisiana cases, some dealing with oil and gas leases 34 2 and others
not.343
Similar to Louisiana, the Kansas Supreme Court in Luthi v. Evans
held that although a transfer of interests under a Mother Hubbard clause
is effective between the parties,
[s]uch a transfer is not effective as to subsequent purchasers and
mortgagees unless they have actual knowledge of the transfer. If,
because of emergency, it becomes necessary to use a "Mother Hub-
bard" clause in an instrument of conveyance, the grantee may take
steps to protect his title against subsequent purchasers.34
On the other hand, Texas and leading commentators disagree with
the Louisiana and Kansas approach. In Gulf Production Co. v. Spear, an
appellate court in Texas held that the recordation of a lease containing a
Mother Hubbard clause was "enough to put subsequent purchasers upon
inquiry as to the land intended to be leased." 4 5 Likewise, oil and gas
scholars have stated that "[a]lthough the burden of search imposed is
substantial, we are of the opinion that recordation of the instrument con-
taining a cover-all clause should be sufficient to impart notice to a subse-
quent purchaser of the prior conveyance of the premises affected by such
clause." 346
340 Id
341 Id
342 Bergeron, 789 So. 2d at 346 (recognizing that the analysis of Mother Hubbard
clauses is different when third parties are involved); see also Energy Development Corp.
v. Quality Environmental Processes, 777 So. 2d 481, 486 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2001)("The
Louisiana Supreme Court and other state courts have consistently held that property de-
scriptions must be sufficiently specific so that third parties can locate and identify the
property.").
343 See O'Meara v. Broussard, 162 So. 2d 777, 778 (La. Ct. App. I Cir. 1964) ("all
right, title, interest, claim or demand of any name, nature, kind or character which the late
[grantor] might have in and to any land or real estate situated in the State of Louisiana
... "). See also Williams v. Bowie Lumber Co., 38 So. 2d 729, 757 (La. 1948)("We did not
say that such a description rendered the sale invalid as between the immediate parties
thereto. On the contrary, we merely held that an omnibus description does not provide
adequate notice to third parties."), and Daigle v. Calcasieu Nat. Bank ofLake Charles, 9
So. 2d 394 (La. 1942) (holding that a clause that purported to transfer "all the property
that [grantor] possesses in his name at the present date in Calcasieu Parish and St. Landry
Parish" was not sufficiently specific to give notice to third parties).
34 576 P.2d 1064 (Kan. 1978).
345 84 S.W.2d 452, 457 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935).
346 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 221.8 at 325.
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What is the Effect of an Assignment of a Lease Containing a
Mother Hubbard Clause?
Another issue is whether a Mother Hubbard clause may be enforced
by a subsequent assignee of the lease. 347 It is clear that when an assign-
ment and the original lease both contain the coverall clause, the clause is
effective just as if it were between the original grantor and grantee.348
Nevertheless, problems have surfaced when a coverall clause is con-
tained in the original document but is omitted from the assignment.
Louisiana addressed this issue in United Gas Public Serv. Co. v.
Mitchell.349 In Mitchell, the original lease contained a Mother Hubbard
clause that probably would have transferred to the grantee an additional
7.25 acres not included within the specific description. 350 However, a
subsequent assignment of the lease omitted the Mother Hubbard
clause.35 As a result, the Court found that, although the Mother Hubbard
clause was probably effective as to the original grantor and grantee, it
was not effective as to subsequent assignees if the assignees did not have
the Mother Hubbard clause in their assignment.352 The holding in
Mitchell is a logical extension of the well-established Public Records
Doctrine in Louisiana.
On the other hand, a contrary view has been taken by cases in Texas
and Mississippi and by oil and gas law commentators.353 In Mann v. Rio
Bravo Oil Co., 354 the Texas Court of Appeals held that, despite the fact
that an assignmnt of a lease contained a particular description of the
property but did not include the original lease's cover-all clause, the as-
signment transferred the lease in its entirety, including an acre adjoining
the tract coverin3 4/10 of an acre. The Mississippi Supreme Court came
to a similar conclusion in Cummings v. Midstates Oil Corp. 3ss Indeed,
347 Id. at § 221.6.
348 See e.g. O'Meara v. Broussard, 162 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964)(holding
that succession sale of decedent's property and as subsequent transfer of such property by
essentially the same omnibus description transferred good title); Cities Service Oil Co. v.
Hilburn, 351 So. 2d 860 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977) (assignment of lease containing Mother
Hubbard clause did not affect court's analysis of whether land was transferred under the
clause).
3 177 So. 697 (La. 1937).
3s0 Id. at 699-700.
35 i.
3s2 Id. at 700.
3s3 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 221.6.
34 107 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Ct. App. 1937). See also Union Pacific Resources Co. v.
Hutchinson, 990 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that original lessee trans-
ferred to assignee an identical right to pool as under the original lease because it was
among the rights included in the all-inclusive description contained in her assignment).
.ss 9 So. 2d 648 (Miss. 1942).
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the Cummings court held that although a subsequent assignment of a
lease did not contain the same cover-all clause as in the original lease,
the "assigning clause transfers to assignees all rights under the lease."356
What is the Effect When a Lease Contains Both a Mother Hub-
bard Clause and a Specific Reservation?
Another problem is encountered in dealing with a Mother Hubbard
clause when a lease or deed contains a specific reservation or exception
reserving some portion of the premises and this exception is followed by
a coverall clause.35 7 In other words, "if the instrument conveys a de-
scribed section 'except the SE 1,' 'except the road,' or 'except the right-
of-way,' but the cover-all clause is adequate to cover the excepted inter-
est, will such excepted interest pass under the instrument?"358
This issue has yet to be addressed by Louisiana courts. In other
states, whether or not an interest is transferred under a Mother Hubbard
clause when there is an exception contained in the conveyance document
depends on the specific facts of the case. Cases often cited on this issue
include Lewis v. East Texas Finance Co.,"5 Melton v. Davis, 36 0 and
Cummings v. Midstates Oil Corp.36' Generally, courts confronted with
this issue consider the placement of the exception and the cover-all
clause within the lease, the grantor's actual ownership of various inter-
ests in the land at the time of the conveyance, the nature of the interest
excepted and the intent of the parties. 36 2
VI.Selected Issues under the Adjacent Lands Clause
An "adjacent lands" clause is often found in standard oil and gas
leases and expressly provides that the lessee may use the surface of the
leased premises to conduct operations on adjacent lands not owned by
356 Id.
357 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 221.2.
358 id.
35 146 S.W.2d 977 (Tex. 1941). The court in Lewis reversed the holding of the court
of appeals that the inclusion of both the Mother Hubbard clause and the reservation re-
sulted in an ambiguity, thus making parol evidence admissible to determine the intent of
the parties. Lewis, 146 S.W.2d at 979-980. The Texas Supreme Court held that despite
the apparent conflict between the two clauses, the document was not ambiguous and pa-
rol evidence was not admissible. Id. The Texas Supreme Court did not reach the issue of
whether the Mother Hubbard clause was still effective when an express reservation was
included in the lease. Id. But see Lewis, 123 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Ct. App. 1938).
' 443 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). The Court in Melton affirmed the Lewis
decision and held that a conveyance of a tract "from which is accepted 4.178 acres con-
veyed to The State of Texas, for right of way ..." conveyed the grantor's mineral interest
in the entire tract.
361 9 So. 2d 648 (Miss. 1942). In Cummings, the court held that a Mother Hubbard
clause controlled over an express reservation.
362 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 2 § 221.2 at 300.17-300.24.
-218-
49
Hebert: A Review of Selected Lease Clauses
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2007
the lessor.6 The purpose of the clause is to promote "efficient develop-
ment of oil and gas fields and the state's public policy of developing
mineral resourcei. The clause was intended to permit a lessee to develop
an oil and gas field without regard to property lines and without the ne-
cessity of constructing duplicative roads, pipelines, tank farms and other
facilities."3 6 4 Moreover, the adjacent lands clause:
resolves the impracticality for a mineral lessee to determine in ad-
vance which tracts of land will share in the production from a spe-
cific well, or whether a specific well will be productive, or whether
the leased premises subject to the "adjacent lands" clause subse-
quently will be pooled or unitized with producing wells on adjacent
lands.
A typical adjacent lands clause reads as follows:
Lessor ... hereby grants, leases and lets exclusively unto Lessee for
the purpose of investigating, exploring, prospecting, drilling and
mining for and producing oil, gas and all other minerals, laying pipe
lines, building tanks, power stations, telephone lines, and other
structures the.reon to produce, save, take care of, treat, transport and
own said products and for dredging and maintaining canals, con-
structing roads and bridges, and building houses for its employees,
and, in general, for all appliances, structures, equipment, servitudes
and privileges which may be necessary, useful or convenient to or in
connection with any operations conducted by Lessee thereon, or on
any adjaceni lands ... (emphasis added) 66
The validity of an adjacent land clause is rarely litigated. Indeed,
there are only two reported cases in Louisiana dealing with the enforce-
ability and scope of an adjacent lands clause.367 Notably, what is meant
by "adjacent" lands has not been addressed by the courts in the context
of an adjacent lands clause.
Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co.: Is the "Mutual Benefit" Principle Appli-
cable to the Adjacent Lands Clause?
The Louisiana Supreme Court has expressly held that the mutual
benefit principle, codified in article 122 of the Louisiana Mineral
363 Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257, 1263 (La. 1999).
364 id.
365 Id.
3 See Caskey, 737 So. 2d at 1259; Blanchard v. Pan-OK Production Co., Inc., 755
So. 2d 376, 385 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2000).
367 Caskey, 737 So. 2d at 1257; Blanchard, 755 So. 2d at 376. See also Richard A.
Lord, 17 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §50:58 (4D 2006); John Y. Pearce & Justin H.
Homes, MINERAL LAW, 47 LA. B.J. 248 (1999); M. Christiansen et al., Oil and Natu-
ral Gas Exploration and Production, 2000 ABA ENV'T, ENERGY, & RESOURCES L.: YEAR
IN REv. 93 (2000).
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368 6Code, is not applicable to an adjacent lands clause.6  In Caskey v.
Kelly Oil Company, the lessee used and improved a road on the leased
premises to gain access to a well site on a neighboring tract of land in
which the lessor had no interest, and the lessor filed suit for trespass. The
court of appeal held that this action violated the mutual benefit principal
codified in article 122 of the Louisiana Mineral Code. The court of ap-
peal explained that article 122 imposes the obligation upon the lessee to
operate the leased property for the mutual benefit of the lessor and les-
see. 370 Indeed, the court of appeal held that although this obligation of
mutual benefit can be contractually defined, the public policy underlying
the obligation cannot be abrogated, and thus, the adjacent lands clause
could be used only when such use benefited both the lessor and the les-
see.3 ' This reasoning was rejected by the Louisiana Supreme Court.37 2 In
so doing, the Court held that it could find "no authority to extend the
scope of the mutual benefit requirement of Article 122 to encompass the
lessee's contractual right to reasonable use of the surface of the leased
premises to operations on adjacent lands, and we conclude that the Legis-
lature never intended for Article 122 to have such a broad sweep." 73
Moreover, the Supreme Court commented that:
[w]hen there are "adjacent lands" clauses in the leases of several
tracts in a field, there is a potential benefit to all lessors, and the fact
that one or more particular lessors ultimately do not receive any
gpecific benefits from the lessee's use'of the surface of the leased
premises to conduct operations on adjacent lands does not affect the
validity of the contractual provision.
Rather than operate for the mutual benefit of the lessor and lessee,
the only limitation of a lessee's actions under the adjacent lands clause is
that such actions be reasonable. In other words, under an adjacent lands
clause, the lessee has the right to use the surface of the leased premises,
but only to the extent it is reasonably necessary for operations thereon
and on adjacent lands.7 Indeed, Louisiana Mineral Code article 11 im-
368 La. Min. Code art. 122 (La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31:122 (2007)) reads as follows:
A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he is bound to
perform the contract in good faith and to develop and operate the property leased as
a reasonable prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Par-
ties may stipulate what shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct on the part of
the lessee.
369 Caskey, 737 So. 2d at 1257.
370 Id at 1261-62.
37 Id at 1260.
37 Id. at 1261.
3 Id. at 1262.
374 Id at 1263-34.
37s Caskey, 737 So. 2d at 1265.
- 220 -
51
Hebert: A Review of Selected Lease Clauses
Published by LSU Law Digital Commons, 2007
poses upon the lessee the duty to use the leased premises and adjacent
lands with reasonable care." The "circumstances which constitute an
unreasonable exercise of contractual rights must be determined on a
case-by-case bas:.s." 3n
To avoid the impact of an adjacent lands clause, the lessors in
Caskey argued that the clause only applies to operations on lands also
owned by the same lessor, equating the clause to a Mother Hubbard
clause.378 The court rejected this argument.37 In distinguishing the two
clauses, the court explained that a Mother Hubbard clause protects the
lessee in the event the description in the lease fails to include adjacent
lands owned by t6e lessor.380 In contrast, the adjacent land clause "refers
to operations conducted on the leased land 'or on adjacent lands,' regard-
less of whether the adjacent land is owned by the lessor."3 8'
The lessor in Caskey also argued that the adjacent lands clause
should only be utilized by a lessee who is also the operator of the
lease.382 The court likewise rejected this argument and held that the rights
of a lease operatcr and the lessee are indistinguishable under the lease.
Moreover, the court stated that "such a restrained interpretation would
render the 'adjacent lands' clause virtually without effect." 384
A final note on Caskey, although the term of the clause was not at
issue in the case, the court discussed the issue in dicta:
the claitse is limiied by the term of the lease which continues in ef-
fect, after the delay rental period, only as long as there is production
in paying quantities on the leased premises. Thus, a mineral lessee
cannot use the "adjacent lands" clause for access to operations on
other premises unless the basic lease is being maintained by pay-
ment of delay rentals or by production.385
376 Id La. Min. Code art. II (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:11 (2007)) reads as follows:
The owner of land burdened by a mineral right or rights and the owner of a mineral
right must exerc-ise their respective rights with reasonable regard for those of the
other. Similarly the owners of separate mineral rights in the same land must exer-
cise their respective rights with reasonable regard for the rights of other owners.
37 Id. For Louisiana's definition of "reasonable use" of the leased premises, See. La.
Min. Code art. 11 (La. Rev. Stat. § 31:11 (2007)); Broussard v. Northcott Exploration
Co., Inc. 481 So. 2d 125 (La. 1986); John McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Min-
eral Law under the New Louisiana Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 729 (1976).
378 Caskey, 737 So. 2d 1264.
" Id. See also Blaachard, 755 So. 2d at 385.
380 Id
381 id
"' Id. at 1264.
.183 Id
5 Id
SCaskey, 737 So. 2d at 1263. The Court further explained this situation in a hypo-
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Thus, any lessee relying on the adjacent lands clause to support op-
erations on adjacent land should bear in mind this limitation. In the event
of lease termination, the right to use such land in connection with opera-
tions on neighboring property would also terminate. Thus, it is still im-
portant to secure a separate surface lease or right of way if available.
Blanchard v. Pan-Ok Prod. Co.: Does the Adjacent Lands Clause
Give the Lessee Access to Adjacent Lands Owned By the Les-
sor?
Lastly, in Blanchard v. Pan-Ok Prod. Co., the argument was made
that the adjacent lands clause, when coupled with a Mother Hubbard
clause, allows the lessee to use the lessor's adjoining land to support op-
erations on the leased premises.386 The factual situation was the exact
opposite to that which had occurred in Caskey. 8 In Blanchard, the de-
fendant lessee used a road located on adjacent lands to conduct opera-
tions on the leased premises. The court distinguished the facts in Blanch-
ard from the facts in Caskey, and found no contractual basis for the use
of adjoining land to support lease operations.
VII. Conclusion
The various topics addressed herein are not exhaustive of the nu-
merous and varied issues that can arise under selected clauses that are the
topic of this paper. Rather, it is the writer's hope that the foregoing dis-
cussion gives to the reader a sampling of the issues that may arise under
the selected provisions addressed.
As discussed throughout, care should be taken in the drafting of
mineral leases. There are many lease forms in use today, and such forms
provide the practitioners with an excellent starting point for drafting
leases for their clients and provide the clients with a degree of known
risk. But, blind reliance on forms should be avoided, and lessors and les-
sees alike should give careful consideration to the prudence of inclusion
of any model form provision.
thetical:
A simple hypothetical illustrates this point. Lessee secures two separate mineral
leases, with "adjacent lands" clauses, covering adjoining properties owned by two unre-
lated entities. Lessee uses the surface of tract A to obtain access to tract B, ultimately
obtaining production on tract B. If tract A is not included in a unit, once the delay rental
period has passed (or in the absence of a delay rental clause), the lessee must obtain pro-
duction on tract A or the lease on tract A will terminate by its own terms.
Id. at 1263, n. 4.
316 Blanchard v. Pan-Ok Prod Co., 755 So. 2d at 385.
387 See Id.
388 The court ultimately held the lessee was entitled to a gratuitous servitude of pas-
sage over a road constructed by a prior lessee on adjacent land also owned by the lessors.
Id.
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